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PRELIMINARY MEMORANDUM 
March 28 1986 Conference 
List 1, Sheet 1 
No. 85-1200-AFX B 
CALIFORNIA COASTAL COMr-1 1 N, et 
al. (regulates mining) 
v. 









1. SUMMARY: Appt contends that ~vironmental r~n of 
private mining on federal national forest land had ~t been preempted ------ --~-- ---------
by the 1872 Mining Act and u.s. Forest Service surface use regula-
tions? 
2. FACTS AND HOLDING BELOW: Appee is presently engaged in commer-
'-- cial mining of a valuable five to seven-acre quarry of high calcium 
·po<.:,!PONE- ~}A 
tA ~-~-~ .J..............,_.....h.."""'-::--"~-:--""'------>_VL..__....w_<,_w f~ ) ~ fka.- ;~St.t.L a-~ch a ~ Llltt~ ry 
whiting grade limestone on and around Mount Pica Blarico in the Big Sur 
'i 
region of Los Padres National Forest. Its mining acti i vity in Big Sur, 
an area of great scenic beauty, includes blasting and opening a quar-
ry, constructing and improving roads, building a bridge, boring test 
holes and conducting core drilling, improving a water storage system, 
and dumping rock waste in a disposal area. Appee has perfected mining 
claims in the area by locating a valuable mineral deposit, by comply-
ing with locational requirements, and by carrying out at least $100 
worth of labor on the claims since 1959. 
In 1981, as required by Forest Service regulations, appee submit-
ted a Plan of Operations for approval by the District Ranger covering 
the period from 1981 to 1986. The plan was accepted with certain mod-
ifications and with the proviso that appee be responsible "for obtain-
ing any necessary permits required by State and/or county laws, regu-
lations and/or ordinance." 
In 19~3, the District Director of the California Coastal Commis-
sion ("CCC") informed appee that it needed to secure a permit for its 
mining operations from the CCC pursuant to the provisions of the Cali-
fornia Coastal Act ("CCA"). Appee then brought an action in USDC 
(N.D. Cal.: Schwarzer, J.) to enjoin CCC officials from requiring a 
coastal development permit. 
Appee first argued that provisions of the Coastal Zone Management 
Act ("CZMA"), 16 u.s.c. §§1451 et seg, incorporated by the CCA in Cal. 
Pub. Res. Code §3008, prevented state regulatio~ The CZMA generally -ation in a "coastal zone", but exempts from its 
~ ------
cov~ d "the use of which is by law subject solely to the dis-
cretion of the Federal Government" and land "the use of which ••• is 
"'----··---------
held in trust by the Federal Government." The DC fo~nd that the land 
' l; 
at issue here did not fall within these exclusionary ~~revisions. Fed-
eral property encumbered by perfected mining claims is by law not sub-
ject "solely" to the govenment's discretion. Nor is the land "held in 
trust" since that phrase was intended to cover Indian lands. Accord-
ingly, appee's claim was a "coastal zone" and the CZMA permitted state 
regulation. 
The DC next rejected appee's contention that the CCA is preempted 
by the federal Mining Act and the Forest Service regulations promul-
gated pursuant to that Act. 
The CA9 reversed. The case need not be decided with reference to 
the CpMA, since the Mining Act provides a 
ing the preemption issue. The 
Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 104 
~~~r ground" for decid-
s stated in 
law 
~ is preempted if th . is evidence of Congressional intent to "occupy a 
given field." Even if Congress has not entirely displaced state regu-
lation, state law is still preempted to the extent it actually con-
flicts with federal law. The legislative intent of the CZMA with re-
spect to preemption is clear: It simply left the preemption issue un-
changed from previous legislation. See Conf. Rep. No. 1544, 92d 
Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1972 u.s. Code Cong. & Ad. News 4822, 
4824 ("the Conferees •.. adopted language which would make certain 
that there is no intent in this legislation to change Federal or state 
jurisdiction or rights in specified fields."). Therefore, the preemp-
tion issue must be resolved by analyzing the 1872 Mining Act. 
The purpose of the Mining Act is to encourage mining on federal 
lands. In 1970, Congress renewed its adherence to this policy, al-
though it also declared its fidelity to the additional goal of lessen-
ing any adverse environmental impact from s~ch mining.~ 30 u.s.c. 
§2la. Although a general federal purpose to encourage a particular 
activity does not automatically preempt state environmental regulation 
that incidentally discourages the activity, see, e.g., Silkwood v. 
Kerr-McGee Corp., supra, at the same time it is not true that a state 
regulation that prohibits mining unless the miner obtains a state per-
mit automatically escapes preemption if issuance of the permit is con-
ditioned only on reasonable requirements. In First Iowa Hydro-
Electric Coop. v. FPC, 328 u.s. 152 (1946), the Court held that the 
Federal Power Act, which establishes a federal permit system authoriz-
ing the construction of hydroelectric dams, preempted a state law that 
prohibited such activity unless the petitioner first obtained a state 
permit. 
The First Iowa doctrine applies to this case. Forest Service 
regulations mandate that the power to prohibit the initiation or con-
tinuation of mining in national forests for failure to abide by appli-
cable environmental requirements lies with Forest Service. 36 C.P.R. 
§§228.4-.5 (1984). The counter position -- that the Mining Act and 
these regulations do no more than encourage mining subject to minimum 
federal environmental regulation, leaving the states free to condition 
the ability to mine on adhering to more stringent requirements, see, 
e.g., State ex rel. Andrus v. Click, 97 Idaho 791, 554 P.2d 969 (1976) 
-- is unpersuasive. At the same time, however, the federal regula-
tions do not go so far as to occupy the field of establishing environ-
mental standards, striking a federally-determined balance between en-
couraging mining and protecting the environment in national forests. 
The Forest Service regulations recognize that a state1 may enact envi-
ronmental regulations in addition to those ~stablishe~ by federal 
agencies. Moreover, States may urge the Forest Service to withhold or 
revoke a federal mining permit from a miner who does not abide by all 
applicable state and federal standards. But an innependent state per-
mit system to enforce state environmental standards would undermine 
the Forest Service's own permit authority and thus is preempted. 
3. CONTENTIONS: Appellant contends that whether states may apply 
their own police power regulation to mitigate the adverse effects of 
private mining on federal land is a recurring federalism question of 
great importance to the Western States. The Forest Service regula-
tions at issue here apply to 140 million acres of land, 38 Fed. Reg. 
34817 (1973), much of it in the West. Colorado, Idaho, Montana, Ore-
gon, Utah, Washington, and Wyoming all have adopted environmental per-
mit regulation of mining on lands within their boundaries, including 
federal lands, similar to the California scheme invalidated here. Dual 
regulation protects both the state and federal interests involved, and 
for more than a century this dual regulation, envisioned in the 1872 
Mining Act, has been a paradigm of cooperative federalism. The CA9's 
decision conflicts with decisions of the Idaho Supreme Court and the 
Wyoming Supreme Court, as well as with an intermediate appellate court 
of Oregon. See State ex rel. Andrus v. Click, supra~ State ex rel. 
Evans v. Click, 102 Idaho 443, 631 P.2d 614 (1981), cert. denied, 457 
u.s. 1116 (1982); Gulf Oil Corp. v. Wyoming Oil and Gas Conservation 
Comm'n, 693 P.2d 227 (Wyo. 1985) ~ State ex rel. Cox v. Hibbard, 31 
Ore.App. 269, 570 P.2d 1190 (1977). 
The CA9's decision misconstrued the Forest Service regulations. 
'--.------- I '~ 
The regulations are replete with provisions sanctionipg the applica-
tion of state law to mining operations. See, e.g., 36 C.P.R. 
§228.8(a) (state air quality standards). Moreover, by providing that 
state "certification[s]" or "approval[s]" of compliance with state 
laws may be accepted as satisfaction of "similar or parallel require-
ments of these regulations," id., §228.8(h), the Forest Service regu-
lations necessarily presume the existence of independent state permit 
systems. Also telling is the fact that for more than 70 years after 
r 
the passage of the 1897 Organic Administration Act, the Forest Service 
thought that it lacked authority to adopt surface protection regula-
tions like those in 36 C.P.R. §§228.1-.15: the states filled this void 
prior to 1974. 
Rather than heeding the admonition that preemption turns on the 
unique features of the particular federal regulatory program involved, 
City of Burbank v. Lockheed Air Terminal, 411 u.s. 624, 638 (1973), 
the CA9 posited a general preemption principle of no dual federal and 
state permits. The notion that the coincidence of federal and state 
regulation automatically leads to preemption was rejected long ago. 
California v. Zook, 336 u.s. 725 (1949). Thus, the predicate for 
what the CA9 called the "First Iowa doctrine", is an intent to elimi-
nate dual regulation or to "occupy the field." Applying this stand-
ard, the regulations are not preempted. 
The CA9's decision to reach the merits violates the ripeness doc-
trine. Because the CCA on its face does not prohibit all mining, and 
because the CCC has consistently acknowledged throughout this litiga-
tion that it cannot prohibit all mining or block the exercise of pri-
vate mining rights, California can and should be allowed to prudently 
' \ 
construed and apply its regulation to avoid any actua~ conflicts with 
federal regulation. 
Eight western states and the territory of American Samoa have 
filed an amicus brief in support of appellant. States have tradition-
ally regulated in this area. Many western states have created permit 
systems and established environmental protection standards that apply 
to mining claims on federal lands. The decision below, in addition to 
conflicting with the decisions cited by appellant, also conflicts with 
Mt. Emmons Mining Co. v. Town of Crested Butte, ~90 P.2d 231 (Colo. 
1984). 
Appee answers that appellate jurisdiction does not lie under 
§1254(2). Appellate jurisdiction is proper only when a statute is 
expressly invalidated, and does not lie in situations, such as the 
present case, where the state's exercise of authority is struck down 
without reference to a specific statute. Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee 
Corp., 464 u.s. 238, 247 (1984). See also Burger King Corp. v. 
Rudzewicz, 105 S.Ct. 2174, 2181 n.l2 (1985); Perry Education Ass'n v. 
Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 u.s. 37, 42-43 (1983). The CA9 did 
not strike down a specific provision of the CCA, but merely held that 
the CCC's purported exercise of land use permit power was preempted. 
The decision below does not conflict with the decision of any 
~
other federal Court of Appeals. [NB: Appee fails to mention the two 
state Supreme Court cases cited by appt.] Moreover, the CA9's deci-
sion follows the rationale of Ventura County v. Gulf Oil Corp., 601 
F.2d 1080 (CA9 1979), which was summarily affirmed by this Court, 445 
u.s. 947 (1980). The decision below is plainly correct, properly re-
,», .. 
lying on Court decisions such as First Iowa Hydro-Electric Coop. v. 
' i 
FPC, supra. Appt's ripeness assertions are precluded,··jby its admis-
sions in its answers to the complaint, wherein appt conceded that the 
applicability of the CCA to the dispute was "ripe." 
The Alaska Miners Association has filed an amicus brief in sup-
port of appee. Section 1254(2) does not confer jurisdiction over this 
appeal. The cz~m permits state regulation in coastal zones, but ex-
eludes from the coastal zone "lands the use of which is by law subject 
solely to the discretion of or which is held in trust by the Federal 
government, its officers or agents." 16 u.s.c. §1453(1). Since in 
fact the CCC lacks state statutory and regulatory jurisdiction to im-
pose such permit requirements outside the coastal zone, no state stat-
ute or regulation has been held unconstitutional. On the merits, the 
CCC cannot saddle approved mining operations conducted on federal 
lands with a duplicative permit system supplanting federal preroga-
tives. 
The American Mining Congress has also filed an amicus brief in 
support of appee, arguing that the pervasive federal legislative and 
regulatory scheme demonstrates an intent to supplant state permit sys-
terns. 
In reply, appellant contends that appee ignores the conflict be-
tween the decision of the CA9 and decisions of the Idaho and Wyoming 
Supreme Court and that Ventura County v. Gulf Oil Corp. involved an 
entirely different regulatory program which implicated different state 
and federal interests. 
4. DISCUSSION: Appellate jurisdiction appears~properly~ ie 
over this appeal. The strongest argument to the contrary derives from 
.._ I ' 




for the preemption grounds. Appellant argued that because 
award was a state statute the CAlO necessarily had he,f d that the stat-
ute was unconstitutional, at least as applied. 464 u.s., at 246. The 
Court disagreed with that proposition, explaining that "we have con-
sistently distinguished between those cases in which a state statute 
is expressly struck down on constitutional grounds and those in which 
an exercise of authority under state law is invalidated without refer-
ence to the state statute. The former come within the scope of 
§1254(2) 's jurisdictional grant. [Cites] The latter do not. Perry 
Education Ass'n, supra, at 42: Hanson v.· Denckla, 357 u.s. 235, 244 
(1958): Wilson v. Coook, 327 u.s. 474, 482 (1946) ." 464 u.s., at 247. 
The Court also observed that statutes authorizing appeals are to be 
strictly construed. Id. 
Nonetheless, in contrast to Silkwood, a state statute here was 
expressly mentioned and, indeed, was the centerpiece of the litigation 
~
below. None of the cases cited in Silkwood involved preemption. The 
Court has exercised appellate jurisdiction over appeals from CA deci-
sions holding that a state statute was preempted. E.g., Ventura Coun-
_!y_ v. Gulf Oil Corp., 445 u.s. 947 (1980) (summarily affirming on CA9 
preemption decision) .1 It seems to me, therefore, that a strong case 
1 Appt is correct that the Court's summary affirmance in this 
Ventura County does not control here. Among other differences, 
the federal statute there was the 1920 Mineral Lands Leasing Act, 
not the 1872 Mining Act involved here. An intention to preempt 
state legislation in the former would not evidence an intent to 
preempt in the latter. See also Pet. for Cert. at 25 n.25 
(citing commentator for the proposition that the two Acts "stand 
incongruously side by side each shaped by the political and 
economic forces peculiar to its own era"). 
can be made that appellate jurisdiction is proper. The issue seems to 







rather than a 
Even if appellate jurisdiction is eventually determined to be 
improper, certiorari jurisdiction would of course lie, and a "grant" 
...___-..... ....._ - --...... -----·-..._. --~..---....... --~--
would appear to be appropriate. Appt correctly characterizes the 
issue as one of great importance. Certainly a large amount of real 
-------
number of Western states have statutes similar to those found preempt-
ed here: appee does not contend that the California regulatory regime 
is sui generis. Moreover, there is a ~a~spli~:fbetween the CA9 and 
the Supreme Courts of Idaho and Wyoming. The CA9 explicitly acknowl-
edged below that it was refusing to follow the decision in State ex 
rel. Andrus v. Click, supra. It is of no consequence, as appee im-
plies, that the split is not among the CA's: Rule 17 indicates that 
one factor considered when reviewing a petition for certiorari is 
whether "a federal court of appeals has decided a federal question in 
a way in conflict with a state court of last resort." 
Appt's ripeness argument appears to have little force. Appt ap-
pears to have conceded ripeness below, although, of course, this con-
cession is not controlling on the Court. Moreover, in Ventura County 
the CA9 entertained a declaratory judgment action in similar anticipa-
tory circumstances, and was summarily affirmed by the Court. 
One last point deserves mention. The CA9 decided this case on 
preemption grounds, concluding that this approach was "narrower" than 
deci~her the CZMA permission of state regulation of only 
"coastal zones" would limit the application of the CCA. Appee will 
presumably be free to urge this point in support of the judgment below 
if the Court agrees to review this case. C~. Quinn v ' United States, 
I! 
No. 84-1717 (seven votes to "DIG", presumably on basis that point 
urged by resp in support of judgment obscured primary "question pre-
sen ted") • Nonetheless, as the CA9's recognition of the broadness of 
this point suggests, the interpretation of the CZMA is itself an im-
portant matter. And even if appee is able to construct an argument 
from the CZMA that requires affirmance, the Court would always be free 
to decide the Mining Act preemption issue and then remand on the CZMA 
issue. Finally, judging from the CA9's brief examination of the leg-
islative history, the CZMA has no independent preemptive force of its 
own: therefore, the CZMA should not obscure the Mining Act preemption 
issue appt presses here. 
5. RECOMMENDATION: I recommend POSTPONE. 
There is a response. 
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AD SENT NOT YOTING 
lfp/ss 08/07/86 COASTAL SALLY-POW 
85-1200 California Coastal Commission v. 
Granite Rock Company 
{CA9) 
MEMO TO FILE: ( ,J~~ u .a--H- ~J 
Appellee is engaged in mining chemical grade 
white limestone on an unpatented mining claim on federal -
land in Los Padres National Forest at Pico Blanco in 
California. The mine is an "open pit" some five to seven 
acres in total. The state of California's brief 
emphasizes the "scenic beauty" of the "nationally renowned 
Big Sur Coast". Pico Blanco is a mountain that is visible 
from a heavily traveled tourist road. According to the 
state, the mining activities include bulldozing, blasting 
and evacuating lime from the pit quarry, and disturbs the 
visual landscape. Appellant, the California Coastal 
Commission {the State) brief emphasizes the state's 
environmental interest. 
Appellee, that prevailed before 
(W~1-) 
CA9, states that 
/\ 
this mineral deposit is the largest of its kind in the 
eleven western states - though the pit i { limited to five 
to seven acres. The deposit's importance derives from the 
2. 
grade and purity of the limestone that is used for 
pharmaceutical purposes, and also has a number of 
"environmental applications including control of acid 
rain, etc." (Appellee's brief, p. 7). 
This case presents the question whether federal 
law preempts the authority of the California Coastal 
Commission (appellant} to require a state permit to mine 
on federal land, particularly where a federal permit has 
been issued to appellee by the Federal Forest Service. 
,.. -
The DC found no preemption, but CA9 - in an opinion by 
Judge Wallace reversed, concluding that the Federal 
Mining Act and Forest Service regulations preempt state 
law. 
A preliminary question arises from the fact that 
we "Postponed". The parties disagree as to whether 
appellate jurisdiction exists. In any event, there is a 
clear conflict and I would grant cert on it. Appellant 
(that I will refer to as the State) also argues that the 
case is not ripe. The courts below disagreed, and so do 
I. 
Although there are several federal statutes, the 
CA viewed the 187~ ~ining ~ct, implemented by the Forest 
Service regulations, as controlling. The "Property 
. . -
' 




the Constitution provides that "Congress shall 
have power to dispose of and make all needful Rules and 
Regulations respecting the territory or other property 
belonging to the United States." Art. IV, §3, Cl. 2. The 
-----·-
federal government holds title to the land in question as 
""'--=-----..-a'--n~a--t · Appellee argues that California 
has no inherent police power to regulate mining activity 
on federally owned land. Appellant (the State) concedes 
that the Property Clause grants Congress legislative power 
over federal lands but argues that the power is not 
exclusive. The State insists that it has concurrent 
legislative power to regulate the use of federal lands --··----
unless and until Congress affirmatively exercises its 
property clause power to preempt state legislation. There 
is no express exercise of such power. 
The State's brief is well written (this cannot 
always be said for California briefs). It attacks the 
decision of CA9 as announcing a "wooden and mechanical 
rule". It cites from a Forest Service regulation (that I 
have not checked) as indicating no federal intention to 
"occupy the field", as the regulation recognizes that a 
state "may enact environmental regulations in addition to 
those established by federal agencies". Here, the state 
" 
.. 1 I· 
argues, regulation by the California Coastal Commission 
"clearly complements the Forest Service's resource 
protection objective to preserve national forest 
resources." Although the 1872 Mining Act, not 
surprisingly, did not mention the need to protect the 
environment, the state argues ~ - with reason - that 
protection of the environment is both a federal and a 
state obligation. The parties do not agree as to the 
effect of the State's requirement of an additional permit. 
As noted above, the State insists that its regulatory ________ ___.,. 
authority - including the requirement of a state permit in 
addition to federal authorization - simply "complements" 
the Fore~~ions. Appellee answers that 
there is an actual conflict. Appellee has operated this 
mine for over two years without objection from the State 
Commission, and now the state demands that appellee obtain 
a state permit or discontinue is mining operations. See 
Joint Appendix 22-23. 
I have not studied the case sufficiently to know 
to what extend the state permit, by its terms, would 
conflict with the federal authority to operate the mine. 
I assume that the state would impose additional 




indication of the extent to which these would handicap 
appellee's operations beyond having another bureaucracy to 
deal with. I would like my clerk's view as to this. 
As there is n~ express preempt ive Jan~uage in any 
of the federal legislation or, I believe, in the Forest 







the Conference and Senate 
Appendix to Jurisdictional 
Statement, A-5, et seq. The State, also relies on the 
legislative history, but cite~ statements by individual 
"\ 
members of Congress. 
* * * 
I had dictated the foregoing before receiving a 
typewritten copy of the SG' s amicus brief that strongly 
supports affirmance of CA9. That court relied on the 
Mining Act and Forest Service regulations in finding 
preemption, and found it unnecessary to decide whether the 
Federal Coastal Zone Management Act (CZMA) also excluded 
state regulation on federal property. The SG, however, -
states that the California Coastal Commission's proposed 
regulation is "specifically prohibited by the CZMA's 
federal lands exclusion." It is also inconsistent, 





the existing programs for managing mining activities of 
federal lands. The "CZMA directly answers the Coastal 
Commission's contentions." Section 304(a) provides that 
states must exclude from their coastal zone management 
programs, "lands the use of which is by law subject solely 
to the discretion of the federal government, its 
officers or agents." 16 u.s.c. §1553(1). The SG's brief 
goes on at considerable length to support these 
conclusions. 
My preliminary scanning of the SG' s typewritten 
brief supports my tentative view that we should affirm 
CA9's decision primarily on the reasoning of the SG. 
Unless my clerk has a different view, a summary memorandum 
will suffice. It would be helpful to identify more 
specifically than I have above, the relevant language in 
the federal acts and the Park Service regulations. 
L.F.P., Jr. 
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BENCH MEMORANDUM 
Mr. Justice Powell October 8, 1986 
From: Ronald 
No. 85-1200, California Coastal Commission, et al. v. Granite 
Rock Co. 
Appeal from CA9 (Wallace, Poole, Stephens (DJ)) 
Set for oral argument Tuesday December 2 
---s.---~~---~;~~---------~---------------------------------------
Jt..L. I"C..V'x~.s ~~ H...-4/1- ../A_~ 4 # 13' 
., 
"· 
Questions Presented (revised by me): ' . ' • 'I 
,· j 
1. Does the Court have appellate jurisdictiod under 28 
u.s.c. §1254(2)? 
2. Does federal law preempt appt' s power to require 
appee to secure a permit. 
I. FACTUAL SUMMARY AND PROCEEDINGS BELOW 
Appee owns unpatented mining claims in the Los Padres ---.:::..----- ____ __,. ...., 
Na~, near the Pacific Ocean in central California. 
Because the claims are unpatented, the federal government retains 
fee title to the property. In 1980, appee began the administra-
tive steps required for opening a mine on this property. As re-
quired by Forest Service regulations, it submitted a plan of op-
erations to the Forest Service. Those regulations require an 
environmental assessment and consultation with responsible state 
agencies. Also, because the land is near the coast, California 
agencies have a statutory right, under the Coastal Zone Manage-
, __....... .::> 
m~ (th~, to insist that the plan be consistent with 
state environmental regulations. Appt, the responsible Califor-
to appee's plan. In 1981, the Forest 
Service approved a modified plan of operations, which ran through 
February 26, 1986. 
Two years later, in October 1983, appt advised appee 
operating its mine unless it obtained 













state permit requirement was preempted. N.D.Ca concLuded that 
1 
I 
the CZMA did not shield appee's activity, because that Act does 
not protect purely private commercial activity from state envi-
ronmental regulation. The court went on to hold that the permit-
ting requirement was not preempted by any of the other federal 
statutes in the area. 
On appeal, CA9 reversed. Declining to reach the CZMA 
question, Judge Wallace relied on the Forest Service permitting 
requirement. In his view, an independent state permitting re-
quirement was inconsistent with, and preempted by, the Forest 
Service's permitting authority. 
This Court accepted the appeal and postponed consider-
ation of its jurisdiction to argument on the merits. 
II. JURISDICTION 
A. Appellate Jurisdiction 
Under 28 u.s.c. §1254(2), appeals can be brought to this 
Court from federal CAs "by a party relying on a State statute 
held by a court of appeals to be invalid as repugnant to the Con-
stitution, treaties or laws of the United States." I conclude 
that there is no such jurisdiction. 
The Court has refused to accept jurisdiction under this 
section when "an exercise of authority under state law is invali-
dated without reference to the state statute." Silkwood v. Kerr-
McGee Corp., 464 u.s. 238, 247 (1984) (you dissented in this 
case, but did not indicate any disagreement with the jurisdic-
q. 
I 
tional analysis). CA9 may hav invalidated the authori~y of appt 
to require a permit, but "the was left untouched." 
Silkwood, 464 u.s., at 247. As appee points out, appt's brief 
has not identified any section (or a single word, for that mat-
ter) of the California Public Resources Code invalidated by CA9's 
decision. Nor does Judge Wallace's opinion specifically invali-
date any such section. The decision is directed more at appt's 
actions than at its enabling statute. 
Similarly, the Court has been reluctant to accept juris-
diction in the absence of a square holding that a state statute 
is invalid. E.g. , Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 10 5 S. Ct. 
2174, 2181 n.l2 (1985). In this case, there is considerable 
doubt that the California legislature intended appt to require a 
permit for a mine on federal land. For lands excluded from the 
coastal zone (as the SG argues these lands are), appt can exer-
cise its authority only to the extent "consistent with applicable 
federal and state laws." Cal. Pub. Resources Code Ann. §30008 
(West Supp. 1986). Cf. Calder v. Jones, 465 u.s. 783, 787 (1984) 
(declining jurisdiction over an appeal from a decision interpret-
ing a state long-arm statute; the statute expressly tied its 
reach to federal law, so it could not be repugnant to federal law 
for purposes of section 1254(2)). Even granting appt's conten-
tion that these lands are part of the coastal zone, doubt remains 
as to whether the statute was intended to apply here; it does not 
expressly authorize application to operations on federal lands. 
CA9's decision had no occasion to address these questions. Thus, 
I do not believe it has the firmness of impact on state law this 
J. 
I 
Court traditionally has demanded to justify exercise of. its man-
lt 
'I 
I datory jurisdiction. 
There are plausible arguments to the contrary, though. 
This Court has interpreted section 1254(2) 's requirement that a 
"statute" be invalidated quite broadly. Thus, even administra-
tive regulations may come within the scope of the statute. See 
Stern, Gressman & Shapiro §2.7, at 52. But I do not think this 
helps appt in this case, because they cite no regulations invali-
dated by CA9's decision. The ~ly wri~~I have seen in-
consistent with CA9's decision are the l~rs from appt ordering 
appee to seek a permit. "Invalidation" of such a letter does not 
pose the type of state-federal conflict that motivated Congress 
to maintain the Court's mandatory jurisdiction in this area. 
You might try to pin appt down at oral argument. In ~ 
particular, it would be useful to force him to point to some par-
ticular state enactment no longer in force because of CA9's deci-
sion. But absent some startling development there, I recommend 
that you vote to dismiss the appeal for want of jurisdiction 
under section 1254(2). 
B. Mootness 
The SG suggests that the case may become moot, because 
Brief for the United 
States, at 7 n.6. This is another good subject for clarification 
at oral argument. But I do not think the case is likely to be-
come moot. Appt contends that neither the CZMA, the Mining Act, 
nor the Forest Service's regulations preempt its authority to 
6. 
I 
require a permit. If appt should prevail here, it COU,'ld estab-
'1 
1 . h · t · · 1 'I 1s 1 s own perm1t process, ent1re y separate from the federal 
permit process. Appee has a substantial interest in evading that 
burden. Thus, I do not think this case will be moot, even if 
appt now is examining appee's new plan for consistency under the 
CZMA. 
C. Ripeness 
I agree with you that this case is ripe. Appee does not 
claim that the burden of the state permitting process is unrea-
sonable. Appee claims that federal law precludes appt from bur-
dening it at all. 
D. Certiorari Jurisdiction 
If the Court dismisses the appeal for want of jurisdic-
tion, it then will examine the papers as a petn for certiorari. 
See 28 U.S.C. §2103. Efficient administration counsels strongly 
against complete dismissal of a case after oral argument, when 
all the parties and amici have gone to the expense of providing 
briefs, and when all the Justices have gone to the labor of con-
sidering the case. 
You indicated that you thought the case was important 
and would be inclined to grant certiorari. Although I agree, I 
wish to point out a few reasons that counsel against such a vote. 
First of all, the case is relatively unusual. I would think that 
most States exercise their statutory right to CZMA consistency 
review. Appt's case arises only because it neglected to do so. 
•' 
7. 
This instinct is confirmed by the lack of ' precedents'• . ,,, neither 
.. 1 I· 
this Court nor any federal CA has examined any of the complex 
statutory questions presented. The case is indeed complicated. 
The Court should think twice about entering such a thicket with- ~ 
out any prior guidance from lower courts. This is especially ~ 
~d~ 
true in this case, where you are inclined to reject appt's posi-
tion on a theory not reached below, and not discussed in the 
briefs of appt or any of his amici. 
Nevertheless, I reluctantly agree that, at this stage, 
it is best to grant cert and review CA9's decision. 
III. THE STATUTORY BACKGROUND 
Because of the multiplicity of statutes relevant to the 
permit received by appee, I think it is best to review briefly 
the important federal statutes in the area before examining the 
legal questions this case presents about those statutes. 
A. Federal Mining Laws 
Although Congress passed specific mining statutes in 
1866 and 1870, the basis for federal mining law in the interven-
ing century has been the General Mining Law of 1872, ch. 152, 17 ---------=-----
Stat. 91 (codified as amended at 30 U.S.C. §§22-39) (the Mining 
Law). Under this statute, individuals can enter federal lands, 
with no prior permit or charge, to prospect for minerals. 30 
u.s.c. §22. Prospectors who discover valuable mineral deposits 
can stake out, or "locate" their claims. A properly located 
' ·-
8. 
claim is usually referred to as an unpatented mining claim. 
Under the Mining Law, such a claim is transferable and exclusive. 
30 u.s.c. §26. If a prospector "patents" his claim, he obtains 
fee simple title to the minerals. The legislative history makes 
clear that the general purpose of the law was to encourage the 
development of mineral resources on federal lands. The continu-
ing vitality of this policy is demonstrated by its frequent ap-
pearances in preambles and legislative histories of statutes in 
the area down to the present day. w 
As appt notes at some length, the Mining Law specifical-
"" 
ly retains State law in some areas. For instance, prospectors 
--------------------
can enter federal lands only in accordance with "the local cus-
toms or rules of miners in the several mining districts." 30 
U.S.C. §22. Congress similarly prescribed the adoption of State 
laws governing location and recording of claims, 30 u.s.c. §28, 
and statutes of limitations, 30 u.s.c. §38. Most importantly for 
the present controversy, Congress has retained a provision of the 
1866 Act, providing: 
As a condition of sale, in the absence of necessary 
legislation by Congress, the local legislature of any 
State or Territory may provide working rules for work-
ing mines, involving easements, drainage, and other 
necessary means to their complete development. Act of 
July 26, 1866, §5 (formerly codified at Revised Stat-
utes §2338, and currently codified at 30 u.s.c. §43). 
As the commercial importance of federal lands in the 
West has increased, and as environmental consciousness has risen, 
the States have begun to insist that their views be considered in 
decisions of federal administrators regulating mining. These 
9. 
concerns culminated in the Federal Land Policy and Management Act 
of 1976 (FLPMA), 43 U.S.C. §§1701-1782. In the FLPMA, Congress 
gave States an explicit role in management of the federal lands. 
The Act directs the Secretary of the Interior to develop land use 
plans for the lands within his jurisdiction. In doing so, "the 
Secretary shall coordinate [his plans] with the land · use 
planning and management programs of other Federal departments and 
agencies and of the States and local governments within which the 
lands are located .... Land use plans of the Secretary ... shall 
be consistent with State and local plans to the maximum extent he 
finds consistent with Federal law and the purposes of this Act." 
43 U.S.C. §1712(c) (9). As the SG explains, this Act ensures that 
the interests of state regulatory authorities will be considered 
by the Secretary of the Interior, but it leaves ultimate control 
over federal land in the hands of the Secretary. The legislative 
history provides considerable support for this interpretation. 
E.g., H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 1274, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 58, reprint-
ed in 1976 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News 6228, 6229. This statute 
does not apply in this case, because the mine is in a national 
forest. I include the statute here because it is an important 
part of the congressional scheme. -
B. Federal Forest Laws 
Section 1 of the Organic Administration Act of 1897, 
codified at 16 u.s.c. §§478, 551, authorized the Secretary of 
Agriculture to regulate notional forests. But that section spe-
' 10. 
cifically reserved the rights of entry granted to prospectors by 
the Mining Law. See 16 U.S.C. §478. 
Under the authority of section 551, the Secretary pro-
rnulgated regulations authorizing mining. 36 C.F.R. §228.1-.15. 
Because the Secretary has exclusive jurisdiction over the nation-
al forests, it is these regulations which implement the provi-
sions of the Mining Law as to national forests. Under these reg-
ulations, a prospector must subrni t a plan of operations to the 
District Ranger in charge of the area. Section 228.8 deals with 
requirements for environmental protection. That section provides 
that all mining operations "shall be conducted so as, where fea-
sible, to minimize adverse environmental impacts on National For-
est surface resources." It includes specific requirements that 
the operator comply with a variety of federal statutes (the Clean 
Air Act, the Federal Water Pollution Control Act, etc.}. The 
regulations also explicitly require compliance with state stand-
ards for air quality, water quality, and the disposal and treat-
rnent of solid wastes. Section 228.8(a)-(c}. Finally, the sec-
tion provides that "[c]ertification or other approval issued by 
State agencies or other Federal agencies of compliance with laws 
and regulations relating to mining operations will be accepted as 
compliance with similar or parallel requirements of these regula-
tions." Section 228.8(h}. 
After these regulations were promulgated, Congress be-
carne concerned about the lack of a general plan for the use of 
the For-
- ~f?l 
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(FRRRPA), codified as amended at 16 u.s.c. §1600-1687. In 1976, 
when Congress passed the FLPMA, creating similar planning proce-
dures for all federal lands (discussed above), it enacted the 
National Forest Management Act of 1976 (NFMA), 16 u.s.c. §§1600-
1614, substantially amending the FRRRPA in. The NFMA extended to 
national forests the other idea of the FLPMA, participation of 
state authorities in forest resource-use decisions. Specifical-
ly, section 6 (a) of the NFMA, 16 U.S.C. §1604 (a), requires the 
Secretary of Agriculture to develop land management plans, "coor-
dinated with the land and resource management planning processes 
of State and local governments and other Federal agencies." See 
also 16 u.s.c. §1712 (requiring the Secretary to hold hearings 
and receive comments from state and local regulators). Although 
this section is worded slightly more narrowly than its FLPMA ana-
logue, 43 u.s.c. §1712(c) (9) (discussed above), there is no ind ?-
cation that Congress intended the provisions to be interpreted 
differently. 
C. The Coastal Zone Management Act (CZMA) 
The Court recently considered this statute in detail in ~ 
CZMA was enacted to encourage "prudent management and conserva-
tion of natural resources in the coastal zone." To encourage 
States to develop coastal zone management plans, Congress provid-
ed that the federal government would subsidize any state plan 




al Commission, appt in this case and in Secretary of the Interi-
~~ 
or, was established in conformity with the CZMA; its ' I plan was 
approved in 1977. 
Like the FLPMA and the NFMA discussed above, the CZMA 
contemplated an important role for state regulation. but the 
CZMA goes farther than either of those acts, which stopped short 
---=--
at requiring federal regulators to consider the views of state 
regulators. The CZMA provides that federal activities within the CZMA 
coastal zone must be "to the maximum extent practicable, consist-
16 u.s. c. 
§1456 (c) (2). 
A ~ of the Act is the definition of the 
I • 
"coastal zone," 16 U.S.C. §1453 (1). As the Court explained in (!..cr4A...f-tJ... 
-;. J /"\A ~ " ' Secretary of the Interior, this definition presents a compromise 0 v---
between the original Senate and House versions of the Act. The 
House Bill provided that all lands nea r the coast would be within 
the coastal zone, directly subject to the state coastal zone au-
thorities. The Senate bill excluded federal lands from the 
coastal zone. As a ~mpromis;?, the Conference excluded federal ~ J..~ 
 
lands from the coastal zone per se, ~t provided that federal .£<.~ 
activities on those lands would remain subject to review for con- ~.~ 
··c~~ 
sistency with state regulation if the activities "directly af- ;p--1Jn-u.. 
fected" the co as tal zone. See Secretary of the Interior, 464 
u.s., at 322-23. (In Secretary of the Interior, you joined JUS-
TICE O'CONNOR's opinion, which held that oil leasing does not 
"directly affect" the coastal zone. This is not an issue in this 




rectly affect" the coastal zone.) Finally, to ensure ,hat state 
'I 
regulators cannot frustrate federal land-use planning through 
dilatory action, the CZMA provides a strict and speedy timetable 
within which States must assert their rights to consistency re-
view. See 16 u.s.c. §1456 (c) (3). 
IV. ANALYSIS 
With this framework in hand I turn to the substantive 
issues of the case. First, I discuss the question that exerci~es 
-J 
the SG: whether appee's mine is in the coastal zone. Although I 
agree with the SG that the land is not in the coastal zone, I do ----------------
not think that question resolves the case. Thus, I turn to a 






permit requirement. I conclude that the permit requirement is .c.~ . ~ - - -~
preempted because it poses a serious obstacle to the goals of the  ~ 
federal statutes that regulate appee' s mine. ~~ 
A. Is Appee's Mine in the Coastal Zone? 
Section 1453 ( 1) excludes from the coastal zone "lands 
the use of which is by law subject solely to the discretion of or 
which is held in trust by the Federal Government, its officers or 
agents." The SG contends that the clause "lands the use of which 
is by law subject solely to the discretion of .. the Federal Gov-
ernment" means "lands owned by the Federal Government." I do not 
find this a very persuasive parsing of the statutory text. "Dis-
cretion" does not seem a likely surrogate for "ownership." 
.14. 
{!) . 1/2) . 1 
the regulat1ons~g1s a-
(;0 'l 
But overwhelming evidence from 
tive history, and this Court's decision in Secretary of the Inte-
rior support the SG's argument. These sources uniformly inter---- ----- ~ 
a minimum, all land owned by the  --pret the statute United States. (I summarize here only the most persuasive of ~ 
h . ~d h f .. htl£.1. t 1s ev1 ence.) T e Department o Commerce regulat1on expllcat-
~ 
ing this section provides: "States must exclude from their  




or whose use is otherwise by law subject solely to the discretion ~'j~'· 
of the Federal Government." 15 C.F.R. §923.33(a) (emphasis 
added) . 
The section-by-section analysis of the Senate Bill in 
which this language originated provides: 
The coastal zone is meant to include the non-Federal 
coastal waters and the non-Federal land beneath the 
coastal waters, and the adjacent non-Federal shorelands 
including the waters therein and thereunder •.•. Howev-
er, such requirements do not ... extend state authority 
to land subject solely to the discretion of the Federal 
Government such as national parks, forests and wildlife 
refuges, Indian reservations and defense establish-
ments." s. Rep. No. 753, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 9 (1972) 
(emphasis added). 
Finally, this Court has described the exclusion as 
reaching "federal parks, military installations, Indian reserva-
tions, and other federal lands that would lie within the coastal 
zone but for the fact of federal ownership." Secretary of the 
Interior, 464 u.s., at 323 (emphasis added). 
Unfortunately, neither appt nor any of his numerous ami-




can, however, extract the gist of the argument made q;elow from 
'I 
the opinion of N.D.Ca, Appendix to Jurisdictional Statement, at 
A-ll to -33 (finding that appee's mine was not excluded from the 
coastal zone) . N.D.Ca placed great emphasis on the plain lan-
guage of the statute. Appee has an enforceable property interest 
in its mining claim. Although the federal government could regu-
late appee' s mining operations, it could not remove the patent 
completely without committing a taking. Thus, N.D.Ca reasoned, 
the use of the property is not subject solely to the discretion 
of the Federal Government. 
N.D.Ca found the legislative history unconvincing, be-
cause none of it addressed private operations taking place on 
federal land. N.D.Ca found it hard to believe Congress intended 
to prevent state regulation not only of federal activities on 
federal lands, but of private activities on federal land. Ac-
cordingly, N.D.Ca found that appee's mining claim was not exclud-
ed from the Coastal Zone. 
There is considerable merit to this argument. As I have 
noted above, the language of the statute does not lead naturally 
to the result the SG favors. It is difficult to say that this 
land is subject "solely to the discretion" of the United States. 
It seems clear that appee has considerable discretion in his de-
cision as to the scope of his mine. 
But I am inclined nevertheless to accept the SG's inter-
pretation. Although the text does not mandate the SG's interpre-
tation, it does not mandate appt's interpretation either. The 
legislative and judicial precedents in support of the SG seem 
16. 
impressive. The SG's interpretation is more logical. ;he inter-
~....._____ '-- -~ ,:1 
pretation accepted by the de, drawing a line between private and 
public activity, does not seem particularly plausible. Moreover, 
as appee points out, the United States does have considerable 
'--- - "'--- ~ ~ L--
discretion over the use of the land. Although it could not 
~ """""-- "\..-- ' . ' . ............, 
"take" the claim, it probably could impose 'tegulati .. ons so burden-
some as to preclude economically feasible develo~en~~~ 
ing all of this, it seems best to accept the interpretation prof-
fered by the agency administering the statute. I recommend that ~ 'r 




/', /) ~ ·~ 
The SG and appellant seem to think that this conclusion ~
~brJ!_ 
No ;4~ 
~_nt.Sl-'> provision of the CZMA explicitly bars state land use regulation ~-
ends the case. But I find the disposition more complicated. 
of federal lands beyond the coastal zone. Indeed, the CZMA re-
quires consistency review for the mine, whether it is in the 
coastal zone or not. On the face of the statute, exclusion from ~~ 
------ ----...... -- "1/ 
the coastal zone has only two effects. First, it changes the .?X~ 
........... ----~~ 
test the Secretary must apply in the consistency review. If the ~ 
mine is in the coastal zone, he must "insure that the project is, cj~ 
to the maximum extent practicable, consistent with approved state 
management programs." 16 u.s.c. §1456 (c) (2}. If it is beyond 
the coastal zone, the Secretary can approve the activity in the 
face of state disagreement, after a hearing, if he determines 
"that the activity is consistent with the objectives of this 
chapter or is otherwise necessary in the interest of national 
security." Second, exclusion from the coastal zone precludes 
17. 
consistency review for activities that do not "directlr affect" 
'I 
the coastal zone, like the oil leasing at issue in Secretary of 
the Interior. 
The Secretary of Commerce's regulations offer strong 
support for this interpretation. They provide: 
In excluding Federal lands from a State's coastal zone 
for the purposes of this Act, a , State does no t_impair 
a ll}L. rigbts or authorities that it may have over Federal 
land~ that exist separate from this program. 15 C.F.R. 
§923.33 (c)(~---~ 
In light of this regulation, I hesitate to base a finding of pre-
emption on the CZMA. 
The best argument against this position rests on the 
CZMA's own preemption provision, 16 U.S.C. §1456 (e) (1). 
section provides: 
Nothing in this chapter shall be construed to diminish 
either Federal or state jurisdiction, responsibility, 
or rights in the field of planning, development, or 
control of water resources, submerged lands, or naviga-
ble waters. 
That 
This section explicitly preserves state rights to regulate wa-
ters. The Court could rely on Congress' failure to mention other 
types of preserved rights as authorization to find preemption of 
those other rights. 
Of course, this interpretation does not explain away the 
regulation. Even if the regulation is broader than the statutory 
preemption provision, I hesitate to label it invalid, particular-




be distinguished by holding that the rights appt seeks 1to assert 
'I ,: j 
are not "separate from" the CZMA. But this is problematic, be-
cause appt admits that its rights under the CZMA have been 
waived. Appt seeks to assert the state's general police power, 
which is indeed arguably "separate from" the CZMA. 
In my opinion, the best explanation for the regulation, 
and for the statutory preemption provision, is that Congress as-
sumed the states had no land-use regulation rights "separate 
from" the CZMA, because earlier statutes in the area had preempt-
ed them. Thus, I think the best course is to examine those ear-
lier statutes to see if they did preempt appt' s permitting au-
thority. If they did, the Court need not address the unbriefed 
questions regarding the CZMA. 
B. Preemption Analysis 
This Court's typical preemption standard provides: 
Congress' intent to pre-empt all state law in a partic-
ular area may Q.e _ i.D ferred where the scheme of federal 
regulation is "sUff iciently comprehensive to make rea-
sonable the inference that Congress "left no room" for 
supplementary state regulation. Preempt ion o f a whole 
field also will be inferred where the field is one in 
which "the federal interest is so dominant that the 
federal system will be assumed to preclude enforcement 
of state laws on the same subject." Hillsborough Coun-
ty, Florida v. Automated Medical Laboratories, Inc., 
105 S. Ct. 2371, 2375 (1985) (citations omitted). 
Although the Court could dispose of the case under this 
standard, the briefs suggest two reasons why the Court might wish 
to articulate a standard more favorable to the United States. 
First, the land is owned by the federal government. Congress has ----
19. 
"Power to dispose of and make all needful Rules and Regulations 
'I 
I 
respecting the Territory or other Property belonging to the Unit-
ed States." u.s. Canst., art. IV, §3, cl. 2; see Kleppe v. New 
Mexico, 429 U.S. 526 ( 1976) (holding that Congress has power to 
preclude the application of state police power regulations to 
federal lands). The SG argues that state regulations cannot be 
applied to federal lands "save as they may have been adopted or 
made applicable by Congress. Brief for the United States, at 25 
(Quoting Utah Power & Light Co. v. United States, 243 u.s. 389, 
405 (1917). Without going into detail, this standard seems ex-
treme to me. In any event, you certainly need not go so far to 
preempt the California regulation in this case. 
Second, the parties argue for a blanket rule that a fed-
eral permit automatically preempts parallel state permit require-
ments. The primary authorities for this position are First Iowa 
Hydro-Electric Cooperative v. FPC, 328 u.s. 152, 164 (1946), and 
Ventura County v. Gulf Oil Corporation, 601 F.2d 1080 (CA9 1979), 
summ. aff'd, 445 u.s. 947 (1980). Again, I think the Court 
should not adopt such a per se rule in this case. The authori-
ties certainly compel no such rule. First Iowa simply stated 
that "[t]o require the petitioner to secure the actual grant to 
it of a state permit •.. as a condition precedent to securing a 
federal license •.. would vest in the [State] a veto power over 
the federal project. Such a veto power easily could destroy the 
effectiveness of the Federal Act." 328 u.s., at 164. In the 
context of the Federal Power Act, those statements seem quite 
justifiable. But I would hesitate to say that state permitting 






requirements necessarily are preempted by parallel fed'eral per-
1 
mitting systems. As for Ventura County, it is a summary affirm-
ance and thus of little precedential value. See, e.g., Massachu-
setts Board of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 u.s. 307, 309 n.l (1976) 
(per curiam). 
The great variety of modern congressional regulation 
schemes counsels strongly against per se statements. Considering 
the important state interests implicated by preemption, the Court 
should tread cautiously before adopting broad per se preemptive 
rules. This case should be decided on the narrowest preemption ~~ 
standard that a firm Court will accept. 
Under the traditional standard, the California permit 
requirement would be preempted if the "scheme of federal regula-
tion is sufficiently comprehensive to make reasonable the infer-
ence that Congress 'left no room' for supplementary state regula-
tion." I think the facts of this case support a finding of pre-
emption under this standard. First, this land belongs to the 
federal government. Although the Court has not yet clarified the 
extent to which state police power can apply to federal lands in 
the absence of congressional action, it is clear that Congress's 
interests over federal land are dominant, and that the State's 
interests are small. Second, the Forest Service Regulations 
under the OAA and the FRRRPA protect the same interests as the 
challenged state regulatory process. Third, in the NFMA, Con-
gress has provided for state input into federal decisions about 
the use of federal lands, requiring federal regulators to listen 
to the concerns of state regulators. Finally, the federal regu-
__.. ... 
\' .· . 
 
21. 
lators have issued a permit, concluding that ' appee's m~~e is the 
!·l 
1 
best use of this particular parcel of federally-owned land. 
I do not think anything in the relevant statutes and 
regulations is inconsistent with this interpretation. I discuss 
only the major points here. Appts rely heavily on 30 U.S.C. §43 
(discussed above, providing that the States can enact working 
rules about easements as conditions of sale). In the whole 
scheme, this is just another of the areas in which Congress, rec-
ognizing the diversity of mining conditions, has adopted local 
rules as federal law. It is a long way from allowing states to 
put conditions on sale to allowing them to frustrate more recent 
statutes by regulating the use of federal land. 
As for the Forest Service regulations, appt focuses on 
36 C.F.R. §228.8(h), which allows compliance with "parallel" 
state regulations to be taken as compliance with the Forest Serv-
ice regulations. I am not persuaded that the Forest Service 
meant by this to acknowledge that "parallel" environmental regu-
lations applied of their own force to federal lands. The regula-
tions specifically required compliance with certain state laws. 
None of those laws are relevant here. I think the regulation 
referred to large operations, occurring partially on federal and 
partially on nonfederal land. National and state forests are 
often geographically intertwined. It seems efficient for the 
Forest Service to accept state environmental findings about the 
effects of an entire project if the state requirements are sub-
stantially identical to the federal requirements. Little purpose 
would be served by duplicate investigation when the state inves-
tigation must occur. Considering 
compliance with certain state laws, 
22. 
the explicit requifement of 
'I 
I would not be inclined to 
find implicit requirements of compliance with more burdensome 
land-use regulations. 
It seems obvious that the congressional scheme would be 
futile if the State could sidestep it and set up a parallel proc-
ess. Thus, I recommend that you find appt's permitting require---------ment preempted. -
V. CONCLUSION 
I recommend the following: 
(1) The appeal should be dismissed for want of jurisdic-
tion under section 1254(2); treating the papers as a petition for 
certiorari, cert should be granted. 
(2) The state permit requirement is preempted. There is 
------"no room" for supplementary state regulation when (a) the State 
seeks to apply its regulations to federal land, (b) Congress has 
enacted statutes addressing the State's concerns, (c) State regu-
lators have an opportunity to see that their interests are con-
sidered by the federal regulatory agency, and (d) the federal 
agency issues a permit. 
j • • 
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85-1200 California Coastal Commission v. Granite Rock 
Company (CA9) (Wallace, J.) 
MISCELLANEOUS NOTES: 
1. Jurisdiction 
We "postponed". As state law was invalidated, we do 
not have jurisdictiion. Section 1254(2). 
2. Treat as cert? I could "deny". There is "no 
conflict", and CA9's decision is the law in California. 
3. On merits, am inclined to affirm. 
Appellee is mining white limestone on federal coastal 
land in California as authorized by Federal ~rvice. 
Although notified, the appellant (California Coastal 
Commission) made no objection for some two years. Complex 
statutes and regulations govern a "cooperative" program of 
coastal development where enviornmental concerns are 
particularly high. The principle statute is the Coastal 
(CZM), of 1972 that was enac~d~~ Zone Management Act 
encourage appropriate use of coastal resources through the 
development of state management programs for the "coastal 
zone". Section 304 (a) of that Act defines the "coastal 
zone" to include coastal waters and submerged lands 
2. 
extending "seaward to the outer limits of the U.S. 
territorial sea". 
For me, a critical fact is that the "lands" at issue 
are owned by the federal government. Section 304(a) of 
the CZMA provides that states must exclude from their 
coastal zone management programs, "lands the use of which 
by law are subject solely to the discretion of the 
federal government, its officers or agents." 
Department of Commerce, the agency responsible for 
implementing the CZMA, by regulation has interpreted 
Section 304 (a) to require that states exclude all lands 
"owned, leased, held in trust or whose use is otherwise by 
law subject solely to the discretion of the federal 
government". Thus, according to 
Coastal ~ ~a~.gme'Q);. Program 
federally owned land. 
the SG, California's 
cannot be applied to 
The foregoing oversimplifies the vast complexity of 
statutes and regulations, but I find both Judge Wallace's 
opinion and the SG's brief persuasive. 
The most relevant case is Secretary of the Interior 
v. California, 464 U.S. 312 (1984) c/o'C). Preemption in 
this case would be consistent with Justice O'Connor's 
! '· 
opinion in that case. 
casting a final vote. 
3. 
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December 4, 1986 
CALIFl SALLY-POW 
MEMORANDUM 
TO: Justice Powell DATE: Dec. 4, 1986 
FROM: Lewis F. Powell, Jr. 
85-1200 California Coastal Commission v. Granite Rock 
1. The Court does not have appellate 
jurisdiction. Treating the papers as a petitioner for 
certiorari, I would grant cert. 
2. Because these lands are owned by the federal 
government, they are excluded from the coastal zone ~1:1~ 
16 u.s.c. §1453(1). 
3. Nevertheless, the Coastal Zone Management Act 
does not preempt the state's authority to regulate federal 
lands. Nothing on the face of the statute requires 
complete preemption of state police power. The Secretary 
of Commerce's regulations specifically preclude preemption 
by this aspect of the Coastal Zone Management Act. 
in this situation I do not 
believe the state can require a separate permit. The land 
is owned by the federal government. The federal 
~overnment has 
~ issued a permit authorizing 
use is appropriate and has 
this use. Before it issued 
' ' r 
2. 
that permit, it considered the same environmental concerns 
the state wishes to consider in its permitting process. 
Also before it issued the permit, the federal agency 
offered the state agency an opportunity to criticize the 
proposed use. If we allowed the state to require a 
separate permit here, I believe it would frustrate the 
purpose of the National Forest Management Act to provide 
for comprehensive federal planning of the uses of the 
national forests. Federal planning is particularly 
important in this case because it allows one agency to 
balance two important interests: the interest and 
expeditious development of federally mineral resources in 
the interest in preserving the national forests. Once the 
Forest Service balances these interests, we should not 
allow the states to balance them differently. 
I vote to affirm the judgment of the Court of 
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. 
Ut:l:t:ll IUt:l. "'+, I ':::100 
To: Justice Powell ''~ ,.,
From: Ronald 
Re: No. 85-1200, California Coastal Commission v. Granite Rock 
Justice Scalia's memorandum of yesterday evening suggested two 
problems. First, he noted that he wished to dispose of this case on the 
narrowest possible ground, because he did not believe the hardest 
question--whether states can require permits for activities on federal 
lands--would occur again. If he wishes to dispose of this case narrowly, 
you might recommend to him that, assuming he does not believe that there 
is appellate jurisdiction, he vote to deny the petition for certiorari. In any 
event, I do believe the question will reoccur, but probably only in CA9. 
Because I believe CA9's judgment is correct, I would not be disappointed if 
the Court denied cert. 
Second, he believes the case is moot, because he believes federal 
agencies routinely allow separate state permitting requirements. On this 
point, I believe he misunderstands the statutory scheme. The Forest 
Service regulations do require companies to secure state permits in 
certain areas--like Clean Water and Clean Air permits. But the relevant 
federal statutes specifically provide that federal agencies must comply 
With state regulations in those areas. The Forest Service does not 
routinely require companies to comply with more general state regulations 
such as the land use regulations at issue in this case. Before approving a 
particular use, the Forest Service listens to the views of the state agency, 
but, acoording to the statute and regulations, the state's views in this 
area are not determinative. 
Thus, the case is not moot, by any means. If you find in favor of 
Granite Rock, it can mTne under its soon-to-be-secured new federal permit 
#>= .. 
without applying to the California Coastal Commission for a separate 
land-use permit. If you find in favor of the California Coastal 
Commission, the Forest Service's permit will not ff' · nt to allow 
Granite Rock to mine; Gram e ock w1ll be forced to seek a separate state 
permit. Moreover, even if my reading of the statutes is incorrect, the case 
is not moot because--as California's attorney noted at oral argument--a 
ruling in favor of the California Coastal Commission would allow that 
agency to force Granite Rock to repair environmental damage it has caused 
under the federal permit, damage that would not have been allowed under 
state regulations. 
In short, I do not believe additional briefing on mootness would be 
useful. 
C HAM BERS O F 
JUSTICE ANTONIN SCALIA 
Jn;rrtm.t Qfltttrl cf tqt ~nittb .ihitts 
~aglfiug4m. '!]. ~. 21l~'l~ 
MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE 
December 4, 1986 
California Coastal Commission v. Granite Rock Co., No. 85-1200 
I am inclined to favor disposing of this case on as 
narrow a ground as possible, in that the difficult issue 
to what extent a state can, without federal permission, 
require environmental permitting on coastal lands -- is 
unlikely to arise again. It is apparently the Forest Service's 
practice routinely to require compliance with such permitting 
requirements. One possible narrow ground of disposition is 
mootness, but I do not think the record is adequately dev e loped 
on this point. 
At argument, I did not pursu e thi s lin e of inquiry b eca use 
I was temporarily persuaded by Californi a 's argument that th e 
dispute remained live because of reclamation issues. Upon 
reflection, however, I am not at all sure that California would 
have any authority to imp~amation require ts even if it 
ha au or1ty o requ1re t e initial permit. Granite Rock never 
was required to obtain the permit, and we do not know what terms 
such a permit would have contained. Hence I am not sure how 
California can impose reclamation requirements on the basis of 
conditions it would have used its permitting authority to impose 
but whose content we do not know. 
I also am not persuaded that thJ s controversy is within the 
"capable of re et~ tion" exception to mootness. The Solicitor 
Genera points out in 1s brLe that it may well not arise with 
respect to Granite Rock's new plan, because California may be 
able to accomplish everything it seeks to accomplish by its 
permit requirement through consistency r e view. 
Thi s i ss u e was n o t di sc u sse d in th e ce rti o r a ri b r i efs , a nd 
was not really bri e fe~ body other than th e G (who did not 
partic1 ate at the certiorari stage) at the merits stag e . See 
Brief for the SG at page 7 note 6. California mentioned it in 
passing in its merits brief at page 12 note 17. I would find 
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CALIFORNIA COASTAL COMMISSION, ET AL., 
APPELLANTS v. GRANITE ROCK COMPANY 
ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT 
[January-, 1987] 
JUSTICE O'CONNOR delivered the opinion of the Court. 
This case presents the question whether Forest Service 
regulations, federal land use statutes and regulations, or the 
Coastal Zone Management Act (CZMA), 16 U. S. C. § 1451 et 
seq., preempt the California Coastal Commission's imposition 
of a permit requirement on operation of an unpatented min-
ing claim in a national forest. 
I 
Granite Rock Company is a privately owned firm that 
mines chemical and pharmaceutical grade white limestone. 
Under the Mining Act of 1872, 30 U. S. C. §22 et seq., a pri-
vate citizen may enter federal lands to explore for mineral de-
posits. If a person locates a valuable mineral deposit on fed-
eralland, and perfects the claim by properly staking it and 
complying with other statutory requirements, the claimant 
"shall have the exclusive right of possession and enjoyment of 
all the surface included within the lines of their locations," 30 
U. S. C. § 26, although the United States retains title to the 
land. The holder of a perfected mining claim may secure a 
patent to the land by complying with the requirements of the 
Mining Act and regulations promulgated thereunder, see 43 
CFR § 3861.1 et seq. (1986), and, upon issuance of the patent, 
legal title to the land passes to the patent-holder. Granite 
Rock holds unpatented mining claims on federally owned 
~ 
u 1- f?. 
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lands on and around Mount Pica Blanco in the Big Sur region 
of Los Padres National Forest. 
From 1959 to 1980, Granite Rock removed small samples of 
limestone from this area for mineral analysis. In 1980, in ac-
- cordance witli federal regulations, see 36 CFR § 228.1 et seq. 
(1986), Granite Rock submitted to the Forest Service a five 
year plan of operations for the removal of substantial 
amounts of limestone. The plan discussed the location and 
appearance of the mining operation, including the size and 
shape of excavations, the location of all access roads and the 
storage of any overburden. App. 27-34. The Forest Serv-
ice prepared an Environmental Assessment of the plan. 
App. 38-53. The Assessment recommended modifications of 
the plan, and the responsible Forest Service Acting District 
Ranger approved the plan with the recommended modifica-
tions in 1981. App. 54. Shortly after Forest Service ap-
proval of the modified plan of operations, Granite Rock began 
to mine. 
Under the California Coastal Act (CCA), Cal. Pub. Res. 
Code Ann. § 30000 et seq. (West) (1986), any person under-
taking any development, including mining, in the state's 
coastal zone must secure a permit from j the California 
Coastal Commission. §§ 30106, 30600. According to the 
CCA, the Coastal Commission exercises the state's police 
power and constitutes the state's coastal zone management 
program for purposes of the federal Coastal Zone Manage-
ment Act, 16 U. S. C. § 1451 et seq. (CZMA), described infra 
pp. -- - --. In 1983 the Coastal Commission instructed 
Granite Rock to apply for a coastal development permit for 
any mining undertaken after the date of the Commission's 
letter.* 
*The Coastal Commission also instructed Granite Rock to submit a 
certification of consistency pursuant to the consistency review process of 
the Coastal Zone Management Act (CZMA), 16 U. S. C. § 1456(c)(3)(A), 
described infra pp. - - -. The Commission subsequently admitted 
that it had waived its right to review the 1981-1986 plan of operation under 
85-1200-0PINION 
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Granite Rock immediately filed an action in the United 
States District Court for the Northern District of California 
seeking to enjoin officials of the Coastal Commission from 
compelling Granite Rock to comply with the Coastal Commis-
sion permit requirement and for declaratory relief under 28 
U. S. C. § 2201. Granite Rock alleged that the Coastal Com-
mission permit requirement was preempted by Forest Serv-
ice regulations, by the Mining Act of 1872, and by the CZMA. 
Both sides agreed that there were no material facts in dis-
pute. The District Court denied Granite Rock's motion for 
summary judgment and dismissed the action. 590 F . Supp. 
1361 (ND Cal. 1984). The Court of Appeals for the Ninth 
Circuit reversed. 768 F. 2d 1077 (1985). The Court of Ap-
peals held that the Coastal Commission permit requirement 
was preempted by the Mining Act of 1872 and Forest Service 
regulations. The Court of Appeals acknowledged that these 
statute and regulations do not "go so far as to occupy the field 
of establishing environmental standards," specifically noting 
that Forest Service regulations "recognize that a state may 
enact environmental regulations in addition to those estab-
lished by federal agencies," and that the Forest Service "will 
apply [the state standards] in exercising its permit author-
ity." 768 F. 2d at 1083. However, the Court of Appeals 
held that "an independent state permit system to enforce 
state environmental standards would undermine the Forest 
Service's own permit authority and thus is preempted." Ibid. 
The Coastal Commission appealed to this Court under 28 
U. S. C. § 1254(2). We postponed consideration of the ques-
tion of jurisdiction to the hearing of the case on the merits, 
- u. s. - (1986). 
II 
First we address two jurisdictional issues. In the course 
of this litigation, Granite Rock's five-year plan of operations 
the CZMA consistency provision by failing to raise its right to review in a 
timely manner. App. at 17. · 
-~-----
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expired. The controversy between Granite Rock and the 
Coastal Commission remains a live one, however, for two 
reasons. First, the Coastal Commission's 1983 letter in-
structed Granite Rock that a Coastal Commission permit was 
required for work undertaken after the date of the letter. 
App. at 22-24. Granite Rock admitted that it has done work 
after that date. App. at 83. Because the Coastal Commis-
sion asserts that Granite Rock needed a Coastal Commission 
permit for the work undertaken after the date of the Com-
mission's letter, the Commission may require "reclamation 
for the mining that [has] occurred, measures to prevent 
pollution into the Little Sur River." Tr. of Or. Arg. 8. 
Granite Rock disputes the Coastal Commission's authority to 
require reclamation efforts. Second, Granite Rock stated in 
answer to interrogatories that its "investments and activities 
regarding its valid and unpatented mining claims require con-
tinuing operation beyond the present Plan of Operations," 
and that it intended to conduct mining operations on the 
claim at issue "as long as [Granite Rock] can mine an eco-
nomically viable and valuable mining deposit under applicable 
federal laws." App. at 83-84. Therefore it is likely that 
Granite Rock will submit new plans of operations in the fu-
ture. Even if future participation by California in the 
CZMA consistency review process, see infra pp. -- ---, 
or requirements placed on Granite Rock by the Forest Serv-
ice called for compliance with the conditions of the Coastal 
Commission's permit, dispute would continue over whether 
the Coastal Commission itself, rather than the federal gov-
ernment, could enforce the conditions placed on the permit. 
This controversy is one capable of repetition yet evading re-
view. See Wisconsin Dept. of Industry v. Gould,-- U. S. 
--, -- n. 3 (1986); Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U. S. 330, 333 
n. 2 (1972). Accordingly, this case is not moot. 
The second jurisdictional issue we must consider is 
whether this case is properly within our authority, under 28 
U. S. C. § 1254(2), to review the decision of a federal court of 
85-1200-0PINION 
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appeals by appeal if a State statute is "held by a court of ap-
peals to be invalid as repugnant to the Constitution, treaties 
or laws of the United States .... " Statutes authorizing ap-
peals are to be strictly construed. Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee 
Corp., 464 U. S. 238, 247 (1984); Perry Education Ass'n v. 
Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U. S. 37, 43 (1983). As 
noted in Silkwood, supra, at 247, "we have consistently dis-
tinguished between those cases in which a state statute is ex-
pressly struck down" as repugnant to the Constitution, trea-
ties or laws of the United States, and those cases in which 
"an exercise of authority under state law is invalidated with-
out reference to the state statute." This latter group of 
cases do not fall within this Court's appellate jurisdiction. 
In the present case, the Court of Appeals held that the par-
ticular exercise of the Coastal Commission permit require-
ment over Granite Rock's operation in a national forest was 
preempted by federal law. The Court of Appeals did not in-
validate any portion of the California Coastal Act. In fact, it 
did not discuss whether the CCA itself actually authorized 
the imposition of a permit requirement over Granite Rock. 
See Cal. Pub. Res. Code Ann. § 30008 (West) (1986) (limiting 
jurisdiction over federal lands to that which is "consistent 
with applicable federal ... laws"). Accordingly this case is 
one in which "an exercise of authority under state law is in-
validated without reference to the state statute," Silkwood, 
supra, at 247, and not within our§ 1254(2) appellate jurisdic-
tion. We therefore treat the jurisdictional statement as a 
petition for certiorari, 28 U. S. C. § 2103, and having done so, 
grant the petition and reverse the judgment of the Court of 
Appeals. 
III 
Granite Rock does not argue that the Coastal Commission 
has placed any particular conditions on the issuance of a 
permit that conflict with federal statutes or regulations. In-
deed, the record does not disclose what conditions the 
Coastal Commission will place on the issuance of a permit. 
85-1200-0PINION 
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Rather, Granite Rock argues, as it must given the posture of 
the case, that there is no possible set of conditions the 
Coastal Commission could place on its permit that would not 
conflict with federal law-that any state permit requirement 
is per se preempted. The only issue in this case is this 
purely facial challenge to the Coastal Commission permit 
requirement. 
The Property Clause provides that "Congress shall have 
Power to dispose of and make all needful Rules and Regula-
tions respecting the Territory or other Property belonging to 
the United States." U. S. Const., Art. IV, § 3, cl. 2. This 
Court has "repeatedly observed" that "'[t]he power over the 
public land thus entrusted to Congress is without limita-
tions."' Kleppe v. New Mexico, 426 U. S. 529, 539 (1976), 
quoting United States v. San Francisco, 310 U. S. 16, 29 
(1940). Granite Rock suggests that the Property Clause not 
only invests unlimited power in Congress over the use of fed-
erally owned lands, but also exempts federal lands from state 
regulation whether or not those regulations conflict with fed-
eral law. In Kleppe, supra, at 543, we considered "totally 
unfounded" the assertion that the Secretary of Interior had 
even proposed such an interpretation of the Property Clause. 
We made clear that "the State is free to enforce its criminal 
and civil laws" on federal land so long as those laws do not 
conflict with federal law. Ibid. The Property Clause itself 
does not automatically conflict with all state regulation of 
federal land. Rather, as we explained in Kleppe, 
"Absent consent or cession a State undoubtedly retains 
jurisdiction over federal lands within its territory, but 
Congress equally surely retains the power to enact legis-
lation respecting those lands pursuant to the Property 
Clause. And when Congress so acts, the federal legisla-
tion necessarily overrides conflicting state laws under 
the Supremacy Clause." Ibid. at 543 (citations omitted) 
(emphasis supplied). 
85-1200---0PINION 
CALIFORNIA COASTAL COMM'N v. GRANITE ROCK CO. 7 
We agree with Granite Rock that the Property Clause gives 
Congress plenary power to legislate the use of the federal 
land on which Granite Rock holds its unpatented mining 
claim. The question in this case, however, is whether Con-
gress has enacted legislation respecting this federal land that 
would preempt any requirement that Granite Rock obtain a 
California Coastal Commission permit. To answer this ques-
tion we follow the preemption analysis by which the Court 
has been guided on numerous occasions: 
"[S]tate law can be preempted in either of two general 
ways. If Congress evidences an intent to occupy a 
given field , any state law falling within that field is 
preempted. [Pacific Gas & Electric Co. v. State Energy 
Resources Conservation & Development Comm'n, 461 
U. S. 190,] 203-204 [(1983)]; Fidelity Federal Savings & 
Loan Assn. v. De la Cuesta, 458 U. S. 141, 153 (1982); 
Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U. S. 218, 230 
(1947). If Congress has not entirely displaced state 
regulation over the matter in question, state law is still 
preempted to the extent it actually conflicts with federal 
law, that is, when it is impossible to comply with both 
state and federal law, Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, 
Inc . v. Paul, 373 U. S. 132, 142-143 (1963), or where the 
state law stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment of 
the full purposes or· objectives of Congress, Hines v. 
Davidowitz, 312 U. S. 52, 67 (1941)." Silkwood v. Kerr-
McGee Corp., 464 U. S. 238, 248 (1984) 
Granite Rock and the Solicitor General as amicus have 
made basically three arguments in support of a finding that 
any possible state permit requirement would be preempted. 
First, Granite Rock alleges that the federal government's 
environmental regulation of unpatented mining claims in na-
tional forests demonstrates an intent to preempt any state 
regulation. Second, Granite Rock and the Solicitor General 
assert that indications that state land use planning over 
unpatented mining claims in national forests is preempted 
I' 
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should lead to the conclusion that the Coastal Commission 
permit requirement is preempted. Finally, Granite Rock 
and the Solicitor General assert that the CZMA, by excluding 
federal lands from its definition of the coastal zone, declared a 
legislative intent that federal lands be excluded from all state 
coastal zone regulation. We conclude that these federal stat-
utes and regulations do not, either independently or in com-
bination, justify a facial challenge to the Coastal Commission 
permit requirement. 
Granite Rock concedes that the Mining Act of 1872, as orig-
inally passed, expressed no legislative intent on the as yet 
rarely contemplated subject of environmental regulation. 
Brief for Appellee at 31-32. In 1955, however, Congress 
passed the Multiple Use Mining Act, 30 U.S. C. §601, et 
seq., which provided that the federal government would 
retain and manage the surface resources of subsequently 
located unpatented mining claims. 30 U. S. C. § 612(b). 
Congress has delegated to the Secretary of Agriculture the 
authority to make "rules and regulations" to "regulate the 
occupancy and use" of national forests. 16 U. S. C. § 551. 
Through this delegation of authority, the Department of Ag-
riculture's Forest Service has promulgated regulations so 
that "use of the surface of National Forest System lands" by 
those such as Granite Rock, who have unpatented mining 
claims authorized by the Mining Act of 1872, "shall be 
conducted so as to minimize adverse environmental impacts 
on National Forest System surface resources." 36 CFR 
§ 228.1, § 228.3(d) (1986). It was pursuant to these regula-
tions that the Forest Service approved the Plan of Opera-
tions submitted by Granite Rock. If, as Granite Rock 
claims, it is the federal intent that Granite Rock conduct its 
mining unhindered by any state environmental regulation, 
one would expect to find the expression of this intent in these 
Forest Service regulations. As we explained in Hills-
borough County v. Automatic Medical Laboratories, Inc., 
-- U. S. --, -- (1985), it is appropriate to expect an 
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administrative regulation to declare any intention to preempt 
state law with some specificity: 
"[B]ecause agencies normally address problems in a de-
tailed manner and can speak through a variety of means, 
. . . we can expect that they will make their intentions 
clear if they intend for their regulations to be exclusive. 
Thus, if an agency does not speak to the question of pre-
emption, we will pause before saying that the mere vol-
ume and complexity of its regulations indicate that the 
agency did in fact intend to pre-empt." 
Upon examination, however, the Forest Service regula-
tions that Granite Rock alleges preempt any state permit re-
quirement not only are devoid of any expression of intent to 
preempt state law, but rather appear to assume that those 
submitting plans of operations will comply with state laws. 
The regulations explicitly require all operators within the 
National Forests to comply with state air quality standards, 
36 CFR § 228.8(a) (1986), state water quality standards, 
§ 228.8(b), and state standards for the disposal and treatment 
of solid wastes, § 228.8(c). The regulations also provide 
that, pending final approval of the plan of operations, the 
Forest Service officer with authority to approve plans of 
operation "will approve such operations as may be necessary 
. for timely compliance with the requirements of Federal and 
State laws .... " § 228.5(b) (emphasis added). Finally, the 
final subsection of § 228.8, "Requirements for environmental 
protection," provides: 
"(h) Certification or other approval issued by State agen-
cies or other Federal agencies of compliance with laws 
and regulations relating to mining operations will be ac-
cepted as compliance with similar or parallel require-
ments of these regulations." (emphasis supplied). 
It is impossible to divine from these regulations, which ex-
pressly contemplate coincident compliance with state law as 
well as with federal law, an intention to preempt all state 
. ~·' 
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regulation of unpatented mining claims in national forests. 
Neither Granite Rock nor the Solicitor General contends that 
these Forest Service regulations are inconsistent with their 
authorizing statutes. 
Given these Forest Service regulations, it is unsurprising 
that the Forest Service team that prepared the Environmen-
tal Assessment of Granite Rock's plan of operation, as well as 
the Forest Service officer that approved the plan of opera-
tion, expected compliance with state as well as federal law. 
The Los Padres National Forest Environmental Assessment 
of the Granite Rock plan stated that "Granite Rock is respon-
sible for obtaining any necessary permits which may be re-
quired by the California Coastal Commission." App. at 46. 
The Decision Notice and Finding of No Significant Impact is-
sued by the Acting District Ranger accepted Granite Rock's 
plan of operation with modifications, stating: 
"The claimant, in exercising his rights granted by the 
Mining Law of 1872, shall comply with the regulations of 
the Departments of Agriculture and Interior. The 
claimant is further responsible for obtaining any neces-
sary permits required by State and/or county laws, regu-
lations and/or ordinance." App. at 54. 
The second argument proposed by Granite Rock is that 
federal land management statutes demonstrate a legislative 
intent to limit states to a purely advisory role in federal land 
management decisions, and that the Coastal Commission per-
mit requirement is therefore preempted as an impermissible 
state land use regulation. 
In 1976 two pieces of legislation were passed that called for 
the development of federal land use management plans af-
fecting unpatented mining claims in national forests. Under 
the Federal Lands Policy and Management Act (FLPMA), 43 
U. S. C. § 1701 et seq., the Department of Interior's Bureau 
of Land Management is responsible for managing the mineral 
resources on federal forest lands; under the National Forest 
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Forest Service under the Secretary of Agriculture is respon-
sible for the management of the surface impacts of mining on 
federal forest lands. Granite Rock, as well as the Solicitor 
General, point to aspects of these statutes indicating a legis-
lative intent to limit states to an advisory role in federal land 
management decisions. For example, the NFMA directs 
the Secretary of Agriculture to "develop, maintain, and, as 
appropriate, revise land and resource management plans for 
units of the National Forest System, coordinated with the 
land and resource management planning processes of State 
and local governments and other Federal agencies," 16 
U. S. C. § 1604(a). The FLPMA directs that land use plans 
developed by the Secretary of the Interior "shall be consist-
ent with State and local plans to the maximum extent [the 
Secretary] finds consistent with Federal law," and calls for 
the Secretary, "to the extent he finds practical," to keep 
apprised of state land use plans, and to "assist in resolving, to 
the extent practical, inconsistencies between Federal and 
non-Federal Government plans." 43 U. S. C. § 1712(c)(9). 
We may assume for the purposes of this discussion that the 
combination of the NFMA and the FLPMA preempt the ex-
tension of state land use plans onto unpatented mining claims 
in national forest lands. The Coastal Commission has con-
sistently maintained that it has no authority to prescribe or 
prohibit particular uses of national forest lands. The Coastal 
Commission insists that the conditions it intends to place on 
its permit to Granite Rock will take the form of environmen-
tal regulation of the mining operation. The line between 
environmental regulation and land use planning will not al-
ways be bright; for example, one may hypothesize a state 
environmental regulation so severe that a particular land use 
would become commercially impracticable. However, the 
core activity described by each phrase is undoubtedly differ-
ent. Land use planning in essence chooses particular uses 
for the land; environmental regulation, at its core, does not 
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however the land is used, damage to the environment is kept 
within prescribed limits. Congress has indicated its under-
standing of land use planning and environmental regulation 
as distinct activities. As noted above, 43 U. S. C. 
§ 1712(c)(9) requires that the Secretary of Interior's land use 
plans be consistent with state plans only "to the extent prac-
tical." The immediately preceding subsection, however, re-
quires that the Secretary's land use plans "provide for com-
pliance with applicable pollution control laws, including State 
and Federal air, water, noise, or other pollution standards or 
implementation plans." § 1712(c)(8). Congress has also 
illustrated its understanding of land use planning and envi-
ronmental regulation as distinct activities by delegating the 
authority to regulate these activities to different agencies. 
The stated purpose of Part 228, subpart A of the Forest 
Service regulations, 36 CFR § 228.1, is to "set forth rules and 
regulations" through which mining on unpatented claims in 
national forests "shall be conducted so as to minimize adverse 
environmental impacts on National Forest System surface 
resources." The next sentence of the subsection, however, 
declares that "[i]t is not the purpose of these regulations to 
provide for the management of mineral resources; the re-
sponsibility for managing such resources is in the Secretary 
of the Interior." Congress clearly envisioned that although 
environmental regulation and land use planning may hypo-
thetically overlap in some instances, these two types of ac-
tivity would in most cases be capable of differentiation. 
Considering the legislative understanding of environmental 
regulation and land use planning as distinct activities, it 
would be anomalous to maintain that Congress intended any 
state environmental regulation of unpatented mining claims 
in national forests to be per se preempted as an impermissible 
exercise of state land use planning. Congress' treatment of 
environmental regulation and land use planning as generally 
distinguishable calls for this Court to treat them as distinct, 
'. 
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until an actual overlap between the two is demonstrated in a 
particular case. 
Granite Rock suggests that the Coastal Commission's true 
purpose in enforcing a permit requirement is to prohibit 
Granite Rock's mining entirely. By choosing to seek injunc-
tive and declaratory relief against the permit requirement 
before discovering what conditions the Coastal Commission 
would have placed on the permit, Granite Rock has lost the 
possibility of making this argument in this litigation. Gran-
ite Rock's case must stand or fall on the question whether 
any possible set of conditions attached to the Coastal Com-
mission's permit requirement would be preempted. As 
noted in the previous section, the Forest Service regulations 
do not indicate a federal intent to preempt all state environ-
mental regulation of unpatented mining claims in national for-
ests. Whether or not state land use planning over unpat-
ented mining claims in national forests is preempted, the 
Coastal Commission insists that its permit requirement is an 
exercise of environmental regulation rather than land use 
planning. In the present posture of this litigation, the 
Coastal Commission's identification of a possible set of permit 
conditions not preempted by federal law is sufficient to rebuff 
Granite Rock's facial challenge to the permit requirement. 
This analysis is not altered by the fact that the Coastal Com-
mission chooses to impose its environmental regulation by 
means of a permit requirement. If the federal government 
occupied the field of environmental regulation of unpatented 
mining claims in national forests-concededly not the case-
then state environmental regulation of Granite Rock's mining 
activity would be preempted, whether or not the regulation 
was implemented through a permit requirement. Con-
versely, if reasonable state environmental regulation is not 
preempted, then the use of a permit requirement to impose 
the state regulation does not create a conflict with federal law 
where none previously existed. The permit requirement it-
self is not talismanic. 
I , 
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Granite Rock's final argument involves the Coastal Zone 
Management Act (CZMA), 16 U. S. C.§ 1451 et seq. , through 
which financial assistance is provided to states for the de-
velopment of coastal zone management programs. Section 
304(a) of the CZMA, 16 U. S. C. § 1453(1), defines the coastal 
zone of a state, and specifically excludes from the coastal zone 
"lands the use of which is by law subject solely to the dis-
cretion of or which is held in trust by the Federal Govern-
ment, its officers or agents." The Department of Com-
merce, which administers the CZMA, has interpreted 
§ 1453(1) to exclude all federally-owned land from the CZMA 
definition of a state's coastal zone. 15 CFR § 923.33(a). 
Granite Rock argues that the exclusion of "lands the use of 
which is by law subject solely to the discretion of or which is 
held in trust by the Federal Government, its officers or 
agents" excludes all federally-owned land from the CZMA 
definition of a state's coastal zone, and demonstrates a con-
gressional intent to preempt any possible Coastal Commis-
sion permit requirement as applied to the mining of Granite 
Rock's unpatented claim in the national forest land. 
According to Granite Rock, because Granite Rock mines 
land owned by the federal government, the Coastal Com-
mission's regulation of Granite Rock's mining operation must 
be limited to participation in a consistency review process de-
tailed in the CZMA. Under the CZMA, once a state coastal 
zone management program has been approved by the Secre-
tary of Commerce for federal administrative grants, "any ap-
plicant for a required Federal license or permit to conduct an 
activity affecting land or water uses in the coastal zone of 
that state shall provide in the application . . . a certification 
that the proposed activity complies with the state's approved 
program and that such activity will be conducted in a manner 
consistent with the [state] program." 16 U. S. C. 
§ 1456(c)(3)(A). At the same time, the applicant must pro-
vide the state a copy of the certification. The state, after 
public notice and appropriate hearings, is to notify the Fed-
'"-."" 
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eral agency concerned that the state concurs or objects to the 
certification. If the state fails to notify the federal agency 
within six months of receiving notification, it is presumed 
that the state concurs. If the state neither concurs nor is 
presumed to concur, the federal agency must reject the appli-
cation, unless the Secretary of Commerce finds that the 
application is consistent with the objectives of the CZMA or 
is "otherwise necessary in the interest of national security." 
I d. 
In order for an activity to be subject to CZMA consistency 
review, the activity must be on a list that the state provides 
federal agencies, which describes the type of federal permit 
and license applications the state wishes to review. 15 CFR 
§ 930.53 (1986). If the activity is unlisted, the state must 
within 30 days of receiving notice of the federal permit appli-
cation inform the federal agency and federal permit applicant 
that the proposed activity requires CZMA consistency re-
view. 15 CFR §930.54 (1986). If the state does not provide 
timely notification, it waives the right to review the unlisted 
activity. In the present case, it appears that Granite Rock's 
proposed mining operations were not listed pursuant to 15 
CFR § 930.53, and that the Coastal Commission did not 
timely notify the Forest Service or Granite Rock that Granite 
Rock's plan of operations required consistency review. App. 
17. Therefore, the Coastal Commission waived its right to 
consistency review of the 1981-1986 plan of operations. 
Absent any other expression of congressional intent re-
garding the preemptive effect of the CZMA, we would be re-
quired to decide, first, whether unpatented mining claims in 
national forests were meant to be excluded from the § 1453(1) 
definition of a state's coastal zone, and second, whether this 
exclusion from the coastal zone definition was intended to 
preempt state regulations that were not preempted by any 
other federal statutes or regulations. Congress has pro-
vided several clear statements of its intent regarding the 
preemptive effect of the CZMA; those statements, which in-
J.,..., , .. 
85-12~0PINION 




dicate that Congress clearly intended the CZMA not to be an 
independent cause of preemption except in cases of actual 
conflict, end our inquiry. 
16 U. S. C. § 1456(e)(1) provides: 
"Nothing in this chapter shall be construed -
(1) to diminish either Federal or state jurisdiction, 
responsibility, or rights in the field of planning, de-
velopment, or control of water resources, submerged 
lands, or navigable waters; nor to displace, supersede, 
limit, or modify any interstate compact or the jurisdic-
tion or responsibility of any legally established joint or 
common agency of two or more states or of two or more 
states and the Federal Government; nor to limit the au-
thority of Congress to authorize and fund projects ... " 
The Senate report describes the above section as "a standard 
clause disclaiming intent to diminish Federal or State author-
ity in the fields affected by the Act," or "to change interstate 
agreements." S. Rep. No. 753, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 20 
(1972). The Conference Report stated, "[t]he Conferees also 
adopted language which would make certain that there is no 
intent is this legislation to change Federal or State jurisdic-
tion in specified fields, including submerged lands." Conf. 
Rep. No. 1544, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 14 (1972). While the 
land at issue here does not appear to fall under the categories 
listed in 16 U. S. C. § 1456(e)(1), the section and its legisla-
tive history demonstrate Congress' refusal to use the CZMA 
to alter the balance between state and federal jurisdiction. 
The clearest statement of congressional intent as to the 
preemptive effect of the CZMA appears in the "Purpose" sec-
tion of the Senate Report, quoted in full: 
"[The CZMA] has as its main purpose the encourage-
ment and assistance of States in preparing and imple-
menting management programs to preserve, protect, de-
velop and whenever possible restore the resources of the 
coastal zone of the United States. The bill authorizes 
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Federal grants-in-aid to coastal states to develop coastal 
zone management programs. Additionally, it author-
izes grants to help coastal states implement these man-
agement programs once approved, and States would be 
aided in the acquisition and operation of estuarine 
sanctuaries. Through the system of providing grants-
in-aid, the States are provided financial incentives to 
undertake the responsibility for setting up management 
programs in the coastal zone. There is no attempt to 
diminis.h state authority through federal preemption. 
The intent of this legislation is to enhance state authority 
by encouraging and assisting the states to assume plan-
ning and regulatory powers over the coastal zones." 
S. Rep. No. 753, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1972) (emphasis 
supplied). 
Because Congress specifically disclaimed any intention to 
preempt pre-existing state authority in the CZMA, we con-
clude that even if all federal lands are excluded from the 
CZMA definition of "coastal zone," the CZMA does not auto-
matically preempt all state regulation of activities on federal 
lands. 
IV 
Granite Rock's challenge to the California Coastal Commis-
sion's permit requirement was broad and absolute; our rejec-
tion of that challenge is correspondingly narrow. Granite 
Rock argued that any state permit requirement, whatever its 
conditions, was per se preempted by federal law. To defeat 
Granite Rock's facial challenge, the Coastal Commission 
needed merely to identify a possible set of permit conditions 
not in conflict with federal law. The Coastal Commission al-
leges that it will use its permit requirement to impose reason-
able environmental regulation. Rather than evidencing an 
intent to preempt such state regulation, the Forest Service 
regulations appear to assume compliance with state laws. 
Federal land use statutes and regulations, while arguably 
expressing an intent to preempt state land use planning, dis-
85-1200--0PINION 
18 CALIFORNIA COASTAL COMM'N v. GRANITE ROCK CO. 
~ 
'! 
tinguish environmental regulation from land use planning. 
Finally, the language and legislative history of the CZMA 
expressly disclaim an intent to preempt state regulation. 
While a fully developed record may demonstrate a conflict 
between the Coastal Commission permit requirement and 
federal law, the barren record in this case cannot justify a 
facial attack on the permit requirement. Consequently, the 
Court of Appeals is reversed and the case is remanded for 
further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
It is so ordered. 
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MEMO TO RONALD: 
Last night I read the first draft of a dissent in 
this case, and I must say that it leaves me in a state of 
considerable confusion. In fairness, I should say that I 
have not found an opportunity to read carefully the 
Court's opinion, and I do not have a grasp of the complex 
of statutes and regulations that I found to be confusing 
in the briefs. It is evident that you do have the 
statutes in mind, and therefore my criticism of your draft 
may not be justified. 
As I perhaps have said before, I like for a dissent 
to be "free-standing" so that the dissent is 
understandable without simultaneously reading the Court 
opinion. I therefore would appreciate your doing a 
second, more carefully framed draft. 
It would be helpful at the outset to summarize what 
the Court does decide in Part III, and - at an appropriate 





which the Court relies in concluding that Congress 
approved some sort of "dual" regulatory system. 
I agree with you that in view of the Property Clause, 
there can be no question as to right of Congress to 
exclude states from all participation with respect to the 
use of federal land. My understanding is that Congress 
has elected to create a regulatory framework under which 
the states are invited to submit their objections to the 
issuance of a federal permit such as the right to mine in 
this case. But Congress has not explicitly authorized a 
dual system, and at least implicitly has made it clear 
that although the views of a state must be considered by 
federal regulators, the final decisions are made pursuant 
to federal law. Any state law to the contrary is 
preempted. 
I understand this is the import of your draft, 
although I do not think you have reasoned it out with your 
customary care and precision. I am much impressed by your 
mastery of the statutory maze, but find including most of 
this in three or four long footnotes is confusing. I 
suggest that the most pertinent statutes be identified in 
the text, together with any regulations that are directly 
pertinent to this case. After all, this case turns on the 
.. 







constitutional power to regulate federal land without 
regard to the views of the states. 
There is no urgency about circulating this dissent, 
and I know - and appreciate - that you are most generous 
in providing assistance to your coclerks in addition to 
keeping fully abreast of your own work. You are the first 
law clerk I have had who gave me bench memos for February 
arguments before the January arguments commenced. 
LFP, JR. 
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In summary, it bears repeating that Congress 
properly and carefully has ensured that affected states 
must be afforded an opportunity to communicate their 
environmental concerns to the federal regulators charged 
with deciding how federal lands should be used. 7 It is 
fair to say, however, that commencing in 1872 Congress has 
created an almost impenetrable maze of arguably relevant 
legislation in no less than a half-a-dozen (Ronald, is it 
six or seven?) statutes, and these are augmented by the 
regulations of two departments of government. There is 
little wonder that confusion exists when one looks only to 





is an evident need for Congress to enact a single 
comprehensive statute for the regulation of federal lands. 
Having said this, it is at least clear that duplicate 
federal and state regulations that could create a conflict 
as to which controls would be intolerable. This being the 
case, as I have noted above, in view of the Property 
Clause of the Constitution, as well as common sense, 
federal authority must control with respect to land 
"belonging to the United States." Yet, the Court's 
opinion today, approves a system of duplicate authority 
with respect to environmental matters, and accordingly the 
net result of today's holding is that state regulators 
have the power to forbid activity on federally owned lands 
expressly authorized by the Forest Service. I dissent • 
. .. 
01/23 To: The Chief Justice 
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Justice White 
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1st DRAFT 
SUPREME COURT OF mE UNITED STATES 
No. 85-1200 
CALIFORNIA COASTAL COMMISSION, ET AL., 
APPELLANTS v. GRANITE ROCK COMPANY 
ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT 
[January-, 1987] 
JUSTICE POWELL, concurring in part and dissenting in 
part. 
Because I agree that this case is properly before us, I join 
Parts I and II of the Court's opinion. In Part III, the Court 
considers a Forest Service permit authorizing Granite Rock 
to operate its mine in a national forest. Because I cannot 
agree with the Court's conclusion that Congress intended to 
allow California to require an additional permit, I dissent 
from Part III. 
I 
A 
To understand Part III of the Court's opinion, one must 
have some knowledge of two groups of statutes and regula-
tions. The first group of provisions regulates mining. As 
the Court explains, the basic source of federal mining law is 
the General Mining Law of 1872, ch. 152, 17 Stat. 91 (codified 
as amended at 30 U. S. C. § 22, et seq.). Ever since the pas-
sage of that law, a prominent feature of federal mining policy 
has been the strong desire of Congress to make federally-
owned mineral resources available for development. See 
General Mining Law § 1, 30 U. S. C. § 22. As the demand 
for minerals has increased during the past century, Congress 
has emphasized that an "economically sound and stable do-
mestic mining ... industr[y]" is important to the economy, 
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and to our nation's security. See Mining and Mineral Policy 
Act of 1970, § 2, 30 U. S. C. § 21a. 1 
In response to the increasing commercial importance of 
federal lands, Congress passed the Federal Land Policy and 
Management Act of 1976 (FLPMA), 43 U. S. C.§ 1701 et seq. 
That statute promotes the effective development of federal 
lands in two ways. First, it directs the Secretary of the 
Interior to inventory the resources located on federal lands 
and to develop comprehensive plans for future development. 
§ 1701(a)(2). Second, it ensures that the States' interests in 
these resources will not be ignored: 
"The Secretary shall . . . coordinate [his plans] with the 
land use planning and management programs of . . . the 
States and local governments within which the lands are 
located. . . . Land use plans of the Secretary . . . shall 
be consistent with State and local plans to the maximum 
extent he finds consistent with Federal law and the pur-
poses of this Act." § 1712( c)(9). 
Significantly, the Land Management Act only requires the 
Secretary to listen to the States, not obey them. As the 
Conference Report explained: "[T]he ultimate decision as to 
determining the extent of feasible consistency between [the 
Secretary's] plans and [State or local] plans rests with the 
Secretary of the Interior." H. R. Conf. Rep. 94-1724, p. 58 
(1976). 
1 See also National Materials and Mineral Policy, Research and Develop-
ment Act of 1980, § 2(a)(l), 30 U. S. C. § 1601(a)(l) (congressional finding 
that the availability of minerals "is essential for national security, economic 
well-being, and industrial production"); § 2(a)(3), 30 U. S. C. § 1601(a)(3) 
(Congressional finding that the extraction of minerals is "closely linked 
with national concerns for energy and the environment"); § 3, 30 U. S. C. 
§ 1602 ("[I]t is the continuing policy of the United States to promote an ade-
quate and stable supply of materials necessary to maintain national secu-
rity, economic well-being and industrial production with appropriate atten-
tion to a long-term balance between resource production, energy use, a 
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B 
The second area of federal law important to this case con-
cerns national forests. In the Organic Administration Act of 
1897, Congress delegated to the Secretary of Agriculture the 
authority to "regulate [the] occupancy and use" of national 
forests. 16 U. S. C. § 551. The Forest Service, as the Sec-
retary's delegate, has promulgated regulations to control the 
"use" of national forests. The Court, by focusing on the For-
est Service's concern for preservation of the national forests, 
characterizes these regulations as "environmental" regula-
tions, in its view something entirely different from "land use" 
regulations. Ante, at 11-13. 
In fact, the regulation of land use is more complicated than 
the Court suggests. First, as is true with respect to the 
Secretary of Interior, the Secretary of Agriculture has been 
directed to develop comprehensive plans for the use of 
resources located in national forests. See Forest and Range-
land Renewable Resources Planning Act of 1974 (Forest 
Planning Act) § 3(a), 16 U. S. C. § 1601. The Forest Plan-
ning Act initially did not require the Forest Service to con-
sider the views of state regulators. But when Congress 
passed the FLPMA in 1976, it also passed the National 
Forest Management Act (NFMA), that amended the Forest 
Planning Act. Of special importance, § 6(a) of the Forest 
Management Act requires the Secretary of Agriculture to co-
ordinate his land management plans "with the land and re-
source management planning processes of State and local 
governments." 16 U. S. C. § 1604(a). Section 14 specifi-
cally requires the Secretary of Agriculture to give state gov-
ernments "adequate notice and an opportunity to comment 
upon the formulation of standards, criteria, and guidelines 
applicable to Forest Service programs." § 1612(a). Thus, it 
is clear that the Secretary of Agriculture has the final author-
ity to determine the best use for federal lands, and that he 
must consider the views of state regulators before making a 
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decision. There is no suggestion in the statute or the legisla-
tive history that state regulators should have the final au-
thority in determining how particular federal lands should be 
used. 
The Forest Service also has a role in implementing the na-
tion's mineral development policy. The Court shrugs off the 
importance of this obligation, noting that "the responsibility 
for managing [mineral] resources is in the Secretary of the 
Interior." Ante, at 12 (quoting 36 CFR §228.1 (1986)). As 
a general statement this is true, but it does not mean that the 
Forest Service makes its decisions on mining permits in a 
vacuum. Instead, it is clear that the Forest Service must 
consider the nation's mineral policy whenever it issues a per-
mit. The Organic Administration Act of 1897 makes clear 
that the Forest Service must act consistently with the federal 
policy of promoting mineral development. Section 1 of that 
act precludes the Secretary of Agriculture from taking any 
action that would "prohibit any person from entering upon 
such national forests for all proper and lawful purposes, in-
cluding that of prospecting, locating, and developing the min-
eral resources thereof." 16 U.S. C. §478. 2 Forest Service 
materials confirm its duty to balance "[t]he demand for 
mineral development . . . against the demand for renewable 
resources and the land management agency's responsibility 
to reasonably protect the environment." Forest Service 
Minerals Program Handbook preface (1983). See also For-
est Service Manual § 2802 (1984) (stating that the Forest 
Service's policy is to "[i]ntegrate exploration, development, 
and production of energy and other mineral resources . . . 
with the use and conservation of other resources to the fullest 
extent possible"); 30 U. S. C. § 1602. In sum, although the 
2 More recently, congressional solicitude for development of federal 
mineral resources led Congress to order the President to "coordinate the 
responsible departments and agencies to, among other measures . . . en-
courage Federal agencies to facilitate availability and development of do-
mestic resources to meet critical materials needs. " 30 U. S. C. § 1602(7). 
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Secretary of the Interior has a substantial responsibility for 
managing mineral resources, the Forest Service also has a 
role in implementing the federal policy favoring development 
of minerals situated on public lands. 
II 
The Court's analysis of this case focuses on selected provi-
sions of the federal statutes and regulations, to the exclusion 
of other relevant provisions and the larger regulatory con-
text. First, it examines the Forest Service regulations 
themselves, apart from the statutes that authorize them. 
Because these regulations explicitly require the federal per-
mits to comply with specified state environmental standards, 
the Court assumes that Congress intended to allow State 
enforcement of any and all state environmental standards. 
Careful comparison of the regulations with the authorizing 
statutes casts serious doubt on this conclusion. The regula-
tions specifically require compliance with only three types of 
state regulation: air quality, see 36 CFR § 228.8(a) (1986); 
water quality, see § 228.8(b); and solid waste disposal, see 
§ 228.8(c). But the Court fails to mention that the types of 
state regulation preserved by § 228.8 already are preserved 
by specific nonpre-emption clauses in other federal statutes. 
See 42 U. S. C. § 7418(a) (Clean Air Act requires federal 
agencies to comply with analogous state regulations); 33 
U. S. C. § 1342(b) (establishing state permit program under 
the Clean Water Act); 42 U. S. C. § 6901(a)(4) (States retain 
primary responsibility for solid waste disposal). The Forest 
Service's specific preservation of certain types of state regu-
lation-already preserved by federal law-hardly suggests 
an implicit intent to allow the States to apply other types of 
regulation to activities on federal lands. Indeed the maxim 
expressio unius, exclusio alterius suggests the contrary. 3 
3 The Court rests this part of its pre-emption analysis on Hillsborough 
County v. Automated Medical Laboratories , Inc., 471 U. S. 707 (1985). 
In that case, the Court stated: "[W]e will pause before saying that the 
'. 
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The second part of the Court's analysis considers both the 
NFMA and the FLPMA. The Court assumes, ante, at 11, 
that these statutes "pre-empt the extension of state land use 
plans onto unpatented mining claims in national forest lands." 
But the Court nevertheless holds that the Coastal Commis-
sion can require Granite Rock to secure a state permit before 
conducting mining operations in a national forest. This con-
clusion rests on a distinction between "land use planning" 
and "environmental regulation." In the Court's view, the 
NFMA and the FLPMA indicate a congressional intent to 
pre-empt state land use regulations, but not state environ-
mental regulations. I find this analysis unsupportable, 
either as an interpretation of the governing statutes or as a 
matter of logic. 
The basis for the alleged distinction is that Congress has 
understood land use planning and environmental regulation 
to be distinct activities. The only statute cited for this prop-
osition is § 202(c)(8) of the FLPMA, 43 U. S. C. § 1712(c)(8), 
that requires the Secretary of the Interior's land use plans to 
"provide for compliance with applicable pollution control 
laws, including State and Federal air, water, noise, or other 
pollution standards or implementation plans." But this stat-
ute provides little support for the majority's analysis. A 
mere volume and complexity of [an agency's] regulations indicate that the 
agency did in fact intend to pre-empt." Id ., at 718. Hillsborough, how-
ever, is quite different from this case. First, the state regulations were 
designed to ensure the health of plasma donors, an aim entirely separate 
from the aim of the federal regulations, to ensure the purity of the donated 
plasma. In this case, by contrast, federal authorities already have consid-
ered the environmental effects of Granite Rock's mine. The California 
Coastal Commission seeks only to reconsider the decision of the federal au-
thorities. In any event, the argument for pre-emption in this case does 
not rest on the Forest Service regulations alone, but also on the compre-
hensive regulatory system enacted by Congress. The Court cannot make 
Hillsborough controlling simply by considering the regulations separately 
from their statutory source. As I explain, infra, at pp. 9-11, the complex 
of applicable statutes and regulations, considered as a whole, pre-empts 
the Coastal Commission's permit requirement. 
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section mandating consideration of environmental standards 
in the formulation of land use plans does not demonstrate a 
general separation between "land use planning" and "envi-
ronmental regulation." Rather, § 202(c)(8) recognizes that 
the Secretary's land use planning will affect the environment, 
and thus directs the Secretary to comply with certain pollu-
tion standards. 
Nor does this section support the Court's ultimate conclu-
sion, that Congress intended the Secretary's plans to comply 
with all state environmental regulations. As I have ex-
plained above, supra, at 5, other federal statutes require 
compliance with the listed standards. 4 Also, because the 
FLPMA requires compliance only with "applicable" stand-
ards, it is difficult to treat this one section as an independent 
and controlling command that the Secretary comply with all 
state environmental standards. Rather, viewing the com-
plex of statutes and regulations as a whole, it is reasonable to 
view § 202(c)(8) simply as a recognition that the Secretary's 
plans must comply with standards made applicable to federal 
activities by other federal laws. 
The only other authority cited by the Court for the distinc-
tion between envionmental regulation and land use planning 
is a Forest Service regulation stating that the Forest Serv-
ice's rules do not "provide for the management of mineral 
resources ," 36 CFR § 228.1 (1986). From this, the Court 
concludes that the Forest Service enforces environmental 
• The Forest Service regulations discussed above mention a slightly dif-
ferent set of environmental standards than does the FLPMA. Both provi-
sions specifically preserve air and water standards. The Forest Service 
regulations also mention solid waste disposal standards; the Land Man-
agement Act also mentions noise control standards. Cf. 42 U. S. C. 
§ 4901(a)(3) (Noise Control Act provision stating that the "primary respon-
sibility for control of noise rests with State and local governments"). The 
slight difference between the two lists of pollution standards, however, is 
insignificant. The feature that all the listed standards have in common is 
that other federal statutes specifically preserve a place for state regula-
tion. See supra, at 5. 
; ' 
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regulation but does not engage in land use planning. This 
conclusion ignores the Forest Planning Act and the NFMA, 
that direct the Secretary of Agriculture and the Forest 
Service to develop comprehensive plans for the "use" of 
federally-owned forest land resources. As the Court ac-
knowledges, these statutes make the Forest Service "respon-
sible for the management of the surface impacts of mining on 
federal forest lands." Ante, at 11. But the Court finds no 
significance in this mandate, just as it finds no significance in 
the Organic Administration Act's command to the Secretary 
of Agriculture to promulgate regulations governing the 
"occupancy and use" of national forests, 16 U. S. C. § 551. 
These regulations are integral to the Forest Service's man-
agement of national forests. To view them as limited to 
environmental concerns ignores both the Forest Service's 
broader responsibility to manage the use of forest resources 
and the federal policy of making mineral resources accessible 
to development. 5 
6 The lack of statutory support for the Court's distinction is not surpris-
ing, because-with all respect-it seems to me that the distinction is one 
without a rational difference. As the Court puts it: "Land use planning in 
essence chooses particular uses for the land; environmental regulation, at 
its core, does not mandate particular uses of the land but requires only 
that, however the land is used, damage to the environment is kept within 
prescribed limits." Ante, at 11-12. This explanation separates one of the 
reasons for Forest Service decisions from the decisions themselves. In 
considering a proposed use of a parcel of land in the national forest, the 
Forest Service regulations consider the damage the use will cause to the 
environment as well as the federal interest in making resources on public 
lands accessible to development. The Forest Service may decide that the 
proposed use is appropriate, that it is inappropriate, or that it would be 
appropriate only if further steps are taken to protect the environment. 
The Court divides this decision into two distinct types of regulation and 
holds that Congress intended to preempt duplicative state regulation of 
one part but not the other. Common sense suggests that it would be best 
for one expert federal agency, the Forest Service, to consider all these fac-
tors and decide what use best furthers the relevant federal policies. 
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The most troubling feature of the Court's analysis is that it 
is divorced from the realities of its holding. The Court cau-
tions that its decision allows only "reasonable" environmental 
regulation and that it does not give the Coastal Commission a 
veto over Granite Rock's mining activities. But if the 
Coastal Commission can require Granite Rock to secure a 
permit before allowing mining operations to proceed, it nec-
essarily can forbid Granite Rock from conducting these oper-
ations. It may be that reasonable environmental regulations 
would not force Granite Rock to close its mine. This misses 
the point. The troubling fact is that the Court has given a 
state authority-here the Coastal Commission-the power to 
prohibit Granite Rock from exercising the rights granted by 
its Forest Service permit. This abdication of federal control 
over the use of federal land is unprecedented. 6 
III 
Apart from my disagreement with the Court's charac-
terization of the governing statutes, its pre-emption analysis 
accords little or no weight to both the location of the mine in a 
national forest, and the comprehensive nature of the federal 
statutes that authorized Granite Rock's federal permit. 
One important factor in pre-emption analysis is the relative 
weight of the state and federal interests in regulating a par-
ticular matter. Cf. Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U. S. 52, 66-69 
(1941). The Court recognizes that the mine in this case is 
located in a national forest, but curiously attaches no signifi-
cance to that fact. The Property Clause specifically grants 
Congress "Power to dispose of and make all needful Rules 
and Regulations respecting the Territory or other Property 
belonging to the United States." U.S. Const., Art. IV, §3, 
cl. 2. See Utah Power & Light Co. v. United States, 243 
U. S. 389, 404 (1917). This provision may not of its own 
6 I express no view as to the Court's conclusion that the Coastal Zone 
Management Act of 1972, 16 U. S. C. § 1451 et seq., does not pre-empt the 
state regulation in this case. See ante, at 14-17. 
• IJ, ~. 
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force pre-empt the authority of a State to regulate activities 
on federal land, but it clearly empowers Congress to limit the 
extent to which a State may regulate in this area. Accord-
ingly, once Congress acts with respect to such activities, du-
plicative state regulations are pre-empted unless Congress 
unambigously has expressed an intent to allow the States to 
share regulatory authority. The Court's opinion identifies 
no such expression of Congressional intent. 
The state regulation in this case is particularly intrusive 
because it takes the form of a separate, and duplicative, per-
mit system. As the Court has recognized, state permit re-
quirements are especially likely to intrude on parallel federal 
authority, because they effectively giye the State the power 
to veto the federal project. See International Paper Co. v. 
Ouellette, --U.S. --, -- (1987); First Iowa Hydro-
Electric Cooperative v. FPC, 328 U. S. 152, 164 (1946). Al-
though the intrusive effect of duplicative state permit sys-
tems may not lead to a finding of pre-emption in all cases, it 
certainly is relevant to a careful pre-emptidn analysis. 
The dangers of duplicative permit requirements are evi-
dent in this case. The federal permit system reflects a care-
ful balance between two important federal interests: the in-
terest in developing mineral resources on federal land, and 
the interest in protecting our national forests from environ-
mental harm. The Forest Service's issuance of a permit to 
Granite Rock reflects its conclusion that environmental con-
cerns associated with Granite Rock's mine do not justify re-
stricting mineral development on this portion of a Federal 
Forest. Allowing the Coastal Commission to strike a differ-
ent balance necessarily conflicts with the federal system. 
Furthermore, as discussed supra, at 2-4, Congress already 
has provided that affected States must be afforded an oppor-
tunity to communicate their concerns to the federal regula-
tors charged with deciding how federal lands should be 
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used. 7 Because Congress has ensured that any federal deci-
sion will reflect the environmental concerns of affected 
States, a duplicative system of permits would serve no pur-
pose. Indeed, the potential for conflict between state and 
federal decisions has obvious disadvantages. 
IV 
In summary, it is fair to say that, commencing in 1872, 
Congress has created an almost impenetrable maze of argu-
ably relevant legislation in no less than a half-dozen statutes, 
augmented by the regulations of two Departments of the Ex-
ecutive. There is little cause for wonder that the language 
of these statutes and regulations has generated considerable 
confusion. There is an evident need for Congress to enact a 
single, comprehensive statute for the regulation of federal 
lands. 
7 The discussion in Part I deals primarily with the FLPMA and the 
NFMA. In this case, the Coastal Commission actually had yet another 
statutory basis for influencing the federal decisionmaking process. Be-
cause Granite Rock's mine is near the California Coast, the Coastal Com-
mission has a right to consistency review under the Coastal Zone Manage-
ment Act of 1972 (CZMA). Thus, if the Coastal Commission had voiced its 
concerns, the Secretary could not have approved this permit unless he de-
termined, after a hearing, "that the activity is consistent with the objec-
tives of [the CZMA] or is otherwise necessary in the interest of national 
security." 16 U. S. C. § 1456(c)(3)(A). Although the Coastal Commission 
had notice of Granite Rock's application to the Forest Service, it did not 
object to Granite Rock's activities until two years after the application was 
approved and Granite Rock began mining pursuant to the federal permit. 
Because the Coastal Commission failed to make a timely complaint to the 
Forest Service, it forfeited its right to consistency review under the 
CZMA. 
By noting the provision for consistency review, I do not imply that the 
CZMA itself pre-empts the Coastal Commission's permit requirement. 
See n. 6, supra. I believe, however, that the provision for consistency 
review, considered with the other specific provisions for state participation 
in the federal regulatory process, indicates that Congress did not believe 
the States could have imposed separate permit requirements, even before 
passage of the CZMA. 
... 
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Having said this, it is at least clear that duplicative federal 
and state permit requirements create an intolerable conflict 
in decisionmaking. In view of the Property Clause of the 
Constitution, as well as common sense, federal authority 
must control with respect to land "belonging to the United 
States." Yet, the Court's opinion today approves a system 
of twofold authority with respect to environmental matters. 
The result of this holding is that state regulators, whose 
views on environmental and mineral policy may conflict with 
the views of the Forest Service, have the power, with re-
spect to federal lands, to forbid activity expressly authorized 
by the Forest Service. I dissent. 
01131 
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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 
No. 85- 1200 
CALIFORNIA COASTAL COMMISSION, ET AL., 
APPELLANTS v. GRANITE ROCK COMPANY 
ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT 
[February - , 1987] 
JUSTICE POWELL, concurring in part and dissenting in 
part. 
Because I agree that this case is properly before us, I join 
Parts I and II of the Court's opinion. In Part III , the Court 
considers the Forest Service's approval of Granite Rock's \ 
plan to operate its mine in a national forest. Because I can-
not agree with the Court's conclusion that Congress intended 




To understand Part III of the Court's opinion, one must 
have some knowledge of two groups of statutes and regula-
tions. The first group of provisions regulates mining. As 
the Court explains, the basic source of federal mining law is 
the General Mining Law of 1872, ch. 152, 17 Stat. 91 (codified 
as amended at 30 U. S. C. § 22, et seq.). In general, that law 
opens the public lands to exploration. If one discovers valu-
able mineral deposits, the statute grants him the right to 
extract and sell the minerals without paying a royalty to the 
United States, as well as the right-subject to certain statu-
tory requirements-to obtain fee title to the land. See Gen-
eral Mining Law§ 1, 30 U. S. C. § 22; United States v. Locke, 
471 U. S. 84, 86 (1968). As the demand for minerals has 
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increased during the past century, Congress has emphasized 
that an "economically sound and stable domestic mining . . . 
industr[y]" is important to the economy, and to our nation's 
security. See Mining and Mineral Policy Act of 1970, § 2, 30 
U. S.C. §21a. 1 
B 
The second area of federal law important to this case con-
cerns the management of federal lands. In response to the 
increasing commercial importance of federal lands, as well as 
the awareness of the environmental values of these lands, 
Congress passed the Federal Land Policy and Management 
Act of 1976 (FLPMA), 43 U. S. C. § 1701 et seq. That stat-
ute promotes the effective development of federal lands in 
two ways pertinent to this case. First, it directs the Secre-
tary of the Interior to inventory the resources located on 
federal lands and to develop comprehensive plans for future 
development. §§ 1701(a)(2), 1711, 1712. Second, it ensures 
that the States' interests in these resources will not be 
ignored: 
"The Secretary shall ... coordinate [his plans] with the 
land use planning and management programs of . . . the 
States and local governments within which the lands are 
located. . . . Land use plans of the Secretary . . . shall 
be consistent with State and local plans to the maximum 
extent he finds consistent with Federal law and the pur-
poses of this Act." § 1712(c)(9). 
' See also National Materials and Mineral Policy, Research and Develop-
ment Act of 1980, § 2(a)(1), 30 U. S. C. § 1601(a)(1) (congressional finding 
that the availability of minerals "is essential for national security, economic 
well-being, and industrial production"); § 2(a)(3), 30 U. S. C. § 1601(a)(3) 
(Congressional finding that the extraction of minerals is "closely linked 
with national concerns for energy and the environment"); § 3, 30 U. S. C. 
§ 1602 ("[I]t is the continuing policy of the United States to promote an ade-
quate and stable supply of materials necessary to maintain national secu-
rity, economic well-being and industrial production with appropriate atten-
tion to a long-term balance between resource production, energy use, a 
healthy environment, natural resources conservation, and social needs"). 
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Significantly, the Land Management Act only requires the 
Secretary to listen to the States, not obey them. As the 
Conference Report explained: "[T]he ultimate decision as to 
determining the extent of feasible consistency between [the 
Secretary's] plans and [State or local] plans rests with the 
Secretary of the Interior." H. R. Conf. Rep. 94-1724, p. 58 
(1976). 
The surface management provisions of the FLPMA do not 
apply to National Forest lands. 43 CFR § 3809.0-5(c) (1985). 
Congress first provided for management of these lands in the 
Organic Administration Act of 1897, that delegated to the 
Secretary of Agriculture the authority to "regulate [the] oc-
cupancy and use" of national forests. 16 U. S. C. § 551. 
The Forest Service, as the Secretary's delegate, has pro-
mulgated regulations to control the "use" of national forests. 
36 CFR § 228.1 et seq. (1986). Persons wishing to mine in 
the National Forests submit plans of operation detailing their 
anticipated activities. If the Forest Service determines that 
the plans comply with the regulations, it approves them and 
authorizes the mining operation. The Court, by focusing on 
the Forest Service's concern for preservation of the national 
forests, characterizes these regulations as "environmental" 
regulations, in its view something entirely different from 
"land use" regulations. Ante, at 11-13. 
In fact, the regulation of land use is more complicated than 
the Court suggests. First, as is true with respect to the 
Secretary of the Interior, the Secretary of Agriculture has 
been directed to develop comprehensive plans for the use of 
resources located in national forests. See Forest and Range-
land Renewable Resources Planning Act of 1974 (Forest 
Planning Act) § 3(a), 16 U. S. C. § 1601. The Forest Plan-
ning Act initially did not require the Forest Service to 
consider the views of state regulators. But when Congress 
passed the FLPMA in 1976, it also passed the National 
Forest Management Act (NFMA), that amended the Forest 
Planning Act. Of special importance, § 6(a) of the Forest 
.. ',.. 
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Management Act requires the Secretary of Agriculture to 
coordinate his land management plans "with the land and 
resource management planning processes of State and local 
governments." 16 U. S. C. § 1604(a). Section 14 specifi-
cally requires the Secretary of Agriculture to give state gov-
ernments "adequate notice and an opportunity to comment 
upon the formulation of standards, criteria, and guidelines 
applicable to Forest Service programs." § 1612(a). Thus, it 
is clear that the Secretary of Agriculture has the final author-
ity to determine the best use for federal lands, and that he 
must consider the views of state regulators before making a 
decision. There is no suggestion in the statute or the legisla-
tive history that state regulators should have the final au-
thority in determining how particular federal lands should be 
used. 
The Forest Service also has a role in implementing the na-
tion's mineral development policy. The Court shrugs off the 
importance of this obligation, noting that "the responsibility 
for managing [mineral] resources is in the Secretary of the 
Interior." Ante, at 12 (quoting 36 CFR § 228.1 (1986)). 
This statement erroneously equates mineral resources man-
agement with land use management. Title 43 of the Code of 
Federal Regulations details the activities of the Bureau of 
Land Management (BLM) in this context. Generally, BLM 
manages the process by which rights to minerals are obtained 
from the United States and protected against others, the 
payment of royalties to the Federal Government, and the 
conservation of the minerals themselves. In some cases-
like oil, gas, and coal-BLM supervises leasing of the right to 
extract the materials. But this case involves "hardrock" 
minerals governed by the Mining Act of 1872. With respect 
to those minerals, the BLM's actions are limited to determin-
ing whether the land is subject to location under the mining 
laws; whether a mining claim is properly located and re-
corded; whether assessment work is properly performed; and 
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complied with. See 43 CFR Parts 3800-3870 (1985). None 
of these determinations is a "land use" determination in the 
sense of balancing mineral development against environmen-
tal hazard to surface resources. The Forest Service makes 
these determinations through its review of a mining plan of 
operation. 
The Organic Administration Act of 1897 makes clear that 
the Forest Service must act consistently with the federal pol-
icy of promoting mineral development. Section 1 of that act 
precludes the Secretary of Agriculture from taking any ac-
tion that would "prohibit any person from entering upon such 
national forests for all proper and lawful purposes, including 
that of prospecting, locating, and developing the mineral re-
sources thereof." 16 U. S. C. §478. 2 Forest Service 
materials confirm its duty to balance "[t]he demand for 
mineral development ... against the demand for renewable 
resources and the land management agency's responsibility 
to reasonably protect the environment." Forest Service 
Minerals Program Handbook preface (1983). See also For-
est Service Manual § 2802 (1984) (stating that the Forest 
Service's policy is to "[i]ntegrate exploration, development, 
and production of energy and other mineral resources . . . 
with the use and conservation of other resources to the fullest 
extent possible"); 30 U. S. C. § 1602. In sum, although the 
Secretary of the Interior has a substantial responsibility for 
managing mineral resources, Congress has entrusted the · 
task of balancing mineral development and environmental 
protection in the National Forests to the Department of 
Agriculture, and its delegate the Forest Service. 
2 More recently, congressional solicitude for development of federal 
mineral resources led Congress to order the President to "coordinate the 
responsible departments and agencies to, among other measures ... 
encourage Federal agencies to facilitate availability and development of 
domestic resources to meet critical materials needs. " 30 U. S. C. 
§ 1602(7). 
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The Court's analysis of this case focuses on selected provi-
sions of the federal statutes and regulations, to the exclusion 
of other relevant provisions and the larger regulatory con-
text. First, it examines the Forest Service regulations 
themselves, apart from the statutes that authorize them. 
Because these regulations explicitly require the federal per-
mits to comply with specified state environmental standards, 
the Court assumes that Congress intended to allow State 
enforcement of any and all state environmental standards. 
Careful comparison of the regulations with the authorizing 
statutes casts serious doubt on this conclusion. The regula-
tions specifically require compliance with only three types of 
state regulation: air quality, see 36 CFR § 228.8(a) (1986); 
water quality, see § 228.8(b); and solid waste disposal, see 
§ 228.8(c). But the Court fails to mention that the types of 
state regulation preserved by § 228.8 already are preserved 
by specific nonpre-emption clauses in other federal statutes. 
See 42 U. S. C. § 7418(a) (Clean Air Act requires federal 
agencies to comply with analogous state regulations); 33 
U. S. C. § 1323(a) (similar provision of the Clean Water Act); ' 
42 U. S. C. § 6961 (similar provision of the Solid Waste Dis-
posal Act). The Forest Service's specific preservation of 
certain types of state regulation-already preserved by fed-
eral law-hardly suggests an implicit intent to allow the 
States to apply other types of regulation to activities on 
federal lands. Indeed the maxim expressio unius, exclusio 
alterius suggests the contrary. 3 
3 The Court rests this part of its pre-emption analysis on Hillsborough 
County v. Automated Medical Laboratories, Inc., 471 U. S. 707 (1985). 
In that case, the Court stated: "[W]e will pause before saying that the 
mere volume and complexity of [an agency's] regulations indicate that the 
agency did in fact intend to pre-empt." ld., at 718. Hillsborough, how-
ever, is quite different from this case. First, the state regulations were 
designed to ensure the health of plasma donors, an aim entirely separate 
from the aim of the federal regulations, to ensure the purity of the donated 
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The second part of the Court's analysis considers both the 
NFMA and the FLPMA. The Court assumes, ante, at 11, 
that these statutes "pre-empt the extension of state land use 
plans onto unpatented mining claims in national forest lands." 
But the Court nevertheless holds that the Coastal Commis-
sion can require Granite Rock to secure a state permit before 
conducting mining operations in a national forest. This con-
clusion rests on a distinction between "land use planning" 
and "environmental regulation." In the Court's view, the 
NFMA and the FLPMA indicate a congressional intent to 
pre-empt state land use regulations, but not state environ-
mental regulations. I find this analysis unsupportable, 
either as an interpretation of the governing statutes or as a 
matter of logic. 
The basis for the alleged distinction is that Congress has 
understood land use planning and environmental regulation 
to be distinct activities. The only statute cited for this prop-
osition is § 202(c)(8) of the FLPMA, 43 U. S. C. § 1712(c)(8), 
that requires the Secretary of the Interior's land use plans to 
"provide for compliance with applicable pollution control 
laws, including State and Federal air, water, noise, or other 
pollution standards or implementation plans." But this stat-
ute provides little support for the majority's analysis. A 
section mandating consideration of environmental standards 
in the formulation of land use plans does not demonstrate a 
general separation between "land use planning" and "envi-
ronmental regulation." Rather, § 202(c)(8) recognizes that 
the Secretary's land use planning will affect the environment, 
ered the environmental effects of Granite Rock's mine. The California 
Coastal Commission seeks only to reconsider the decision of the federal au-
thorities. In any event, the argument for pre-emption in this case does 
not rest on the Forest Service regulations alone, but also on the compre-
hensive regulatory system enacted by Congress. The Court cannot make 
Hillsborough controlling simply by considering the regulations separately 
from their statutory source. As I explain, infra, at pp. 9-11 , the complex 
of applicable statutes and regulations, considered as a whole, pre-empts 
the Coastal Commission's permit requirement. 
·- ')< : 
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and thus directs the Secretary to comply with certain pollu-
tion standards. 
Nor does this section support the Court's ultimate conclu-
sion, that Congress intended the Secretary's plans to comply 
with all state environmental regulations. As I have ex-
plained above, supra, at 5, other federal statutes require 
compliance with the listed standards. 4 Also, because the 
FLPMA requires compliance only with "applicable" stand-
ards, it is difficult to treat this one section as an independent 
and controlling command that the Secretary comply with all 
state environmental standards. Rather, viewing the com-
plex of statutes and regulations as a whole, it is reasonable to 
view § 202(c)(8) simply as a recognition that the Secretary's 
plans must comply with standards made applicable to federal 
activities by other federal laws. 
The only other authority cited by the Court for the distinc-
tion between environmental regulation and land use planning 
is a Forest Service regulation stating that the Forest Serv-
ice's rules do not "provide for the management of mineral 
resources," 36 CFR § 228.1 (1986). From this, the Court 
concludes that the Forest Service enforces environmental 
regulation but does not engage in land use planning. This 
conclusion misunderstands the division of authority between 
the BLM and the Forest Service. As explained above, 
supra, at 4-5, the BLM's management of minerals does not 
entail management of surface resources or the evaluation of 
4 The Forest Service regulations discussed above mention a slightly dif-
ferent set of environmental standards than does the FLPMA. Both provi-
sions specifically preserve air and water standards. The Forest Service 
regulations also mention solid waste disposal standards; the Land Man-
agement Act also mentions noise control standards. Cf. 42 U. S. C. 
§ 4901(a)(3) (Noise Control Act provision stating that the "primary respon-
sibility for control of noise rests with State and local governments"). The 
slight difference between the two lists of pollution standards, however, is 
insignificant. The feature that all the listed standards have in common is 
that other federal statutes specifically preserve a place for state regula-
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surface impacts. As the Court acknowledges, it is the For-
est Service that is "responsible for the management of the 
surface impacts of mining on federal forest lands." Ante, at 
11. The Forest Planning Act and the NFMA direct the Sec-
retary of Agriculture and the Forest Service to develop com-
prehensive plans for the use of forest resources. Similarly, 
the Organic Administration Act commands the Secretary of 
Agriculture to promulgate regulations governing the "occu-
pancy and use" of national forests, 16 U. S. C. § 551. These 
regulations are integral to the Forest Service's management 
of national forests. To view them as limited to environmen-
tal concerns ignores both the Forest Service's broader re-
sponsibility to manage the use of forest resources and the 
federal policy of making mineral resources accessible to 
development. 5 The Coastal Commission has no interest in 
the matters within the jurisdiction of the BLM; the regula-
tions that it seeks to impose concern matters wholly within 
the control of the Forest Service. Thus, this regulation does 
6 The lack of statutory support for the Court's distinction is not surpris-
ing, because-with all respect-it seems to me that the distinction is one 
without a rational difference. As the Court puts it: "Land use planning in 
essence chooses particular uses for the land; environmental regulation, at 
its core, does not mandate particular uses of the land but requires only 
that, however the land is used, damage to the environment is kept within 
prescribed limits." Ante, at 11-12. This explanation separates one of the 
reasons for Forest Service decisions from the decisions themselves. In 
considering a proposed use of a parcel of land in the national forest , the 
Forest Service regulations consider the damage the use will cause to the 
environment as well as the federal interest in making resources on public 
lands accessible to development. The Forest Service may decide that the 
proposed use is appropriate, that it is inappropriate, or that it would be 
appropriate only if further steps are taken to protect the environment. 
The Court divides this decision into two distinct types of regulation and 
holds that Congress intended to preempt duplicative state regulation of 
one part but not the other. Common sense suggests that it would be best 
for one expert federal agency, the Forest Service, to consider all these 
factors and decide what use best furthers the relevant federal policies. 
~ .. 
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not support the Court's distinction between environmental \ 
regulation and land use planning. 
The most troubling feature of the Court's analysis is that it 
is divorced from the realities of its holding. The Court cau-
tions that its decision allows only "reasonable" environmental 
regulation and that it does not give the Coastal Commission a 
veto over Granite Rock's mining activities. But if the 
Coastal Commission can require Granite Rock to secure a 
permit before allowing mining operations to proceed, it nec-
essarily can forbid Granite Rock from conducting these oper-
ations. It may be that reasonable environmental regulations 
would not force Granite Rock to close its mine. This misses 
the point. The troubling fact is that the Court has given a 
state authority-here the Coastal Commission-the power to 
prohibit Granite Rock from exercising the rights granted by 
its Forest Service permit. This abdication of federal control 
over the use of federal land is unprecedented. 6 
III 
Apart from my disagreement with the Court's charac-
terization of the governing statutes, its pre-emption analysis 
accords little or no weight to both the location of the mine in a 
national forest, and the comprehensive nature of the federal 
statutes that authorized Granite Rock's federal permit. 
One important factor in pre-emption analysis is the relative 
weight of the state and federal interests in regulating a par-
ticular matter. Cf. Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U. S. 52, 66-69 
(1941). The Court recognizes that the mine in this case is 
located in a national forest, but curiously attaches no signifi-
cance to that fact. The Property Clause specifically grants 
Congress "Power to dispose of and make all needful Rules 
and Regulations respecting the Territory or other Property 
belonging to the United States." U. S. Const., Art. IV, §3, 
6 I express no view as to the Court's conclusion that the Coastal Zone 
Management Act of 1972, 16 U. S. C. § 1451 et seq., does not pre-empt the 
state regulation in this case. See ante, at 14-17. 
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cl. 2. See Utah Power & Light Co. v. United States, 243 
U. S. 389, 404 (1917). This provision may not of its own 
force pre-empt the authority of a State to regulate activities 
on federal land, but it clearly empowers Congress to limit the 
extent to which a State may regulate in this area. In light of ( 
this clear constitutional allocation of power, the location of 
the mine in a national forest should make us less reluctant to 
find pre-emption than we are in other contexts. 
The state regulation in this case is particularly intrusive 
because it takes the form of a se~arate, and duplicative, per-
mit system. As the Court has recognized, state permit re-
quirements are especially likely to intrude on parallel federal 
authority, because they effectively give the State the power 
to veto the federal project. See International Paper Co. v. 
Ouellette, -- U. S. --, -- (1987); First Iowa Hydro-
Electric Cooperative v. FPC, 328 U. S. 152, 164 (1946). Al-
though the intrusive effect of duplicative state permit sys-
tems may not lead to a finding of pre-emption in all cases, it 
certainly is relevant to a careful pre-emption analysis. 
The dangers of duplicative permit requirements are evi-
dent in this case. The federal permit system reflects a care-
ful balance between two important federal interests: the in-
terest in developing mineral resources on federal land, and 
the interest in protecting our national forests from environ-
mental harm. The Forest Service's issuance of a permit to 
Granite Rock reflects its conclusion that environmental con-
cerns associated with Granite Rock's mine do not justify re-
stricting mineral development on this portion of a Federal 
Forest. Allowing the Coastal Commission to strike a differ-
ent balance necessarily conflicts with the federal system. 
Furthermore, as discussed supra, at 2-4, Congress already 
has provided that affected States must be afforded an oppor-
tunity to communicate their concerns to the federal regu-
lators charged with deciding how federal lands should be 
. .. 
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used. 7 Because Congress has ensured that any federal deci-
sion will reflect the environmental concerns of affected 
States, a duplicative system of permits would serve no pur-
pose. Indeed, the potential for conflict between state and 
federal decisions has obvious disadvantages. 
IV 
In summary, it is fair to say that, commencing in 1872, 
Congress has created an almost impenetrable maze of argu-
ably relevant legislation in no less than a half-dozen statutes, 
augmented by the regulations of two Departments of the Ex-
ecutive. There is little cause for wonder that the language 
of these statutes and regulations has generated considerable 
confusion. There is an evident need for Congress to enact a 
single, comprehensive statute for the regulation of federal 
lands. 
7 The discussion in Part I deals primarily with the FLPMA and the 
NFMA. In this case, the Coastal Commission actually had yet another 
statutory basis for influencing the federal decisionmaking process. 
Because Granite Rock's mine is near the California Coast, the Coastal 
Commission has a right to consistency review under the Coastal Zone Man-
agement Act of 1972 (CZMA). Thus, if the Coastal Commission had 
voiced its concerns, the Secretary could not have approved this permit un-
less he determined, after a hearing, "that the activity is consistent with the 
objectives of [the CZMA] or is otherwise necessary in the interest of na-
tional security." 16 U. S. C. § 1456(c)(3)(A). Although the Coastal Com-
mission had notice of Granite Rock's application to the Forest Service, it 
did not object to Granite Rock's activities until two years after the applica-
tion was approved and Granite Rock began mining pursuant to the federal 
permit. Because the Coastal Commission failed to make a timely com-
plaint to the Forest Service, it forfeited its right to consistency review 
under the CZMA. 
By noting the provision for consistency review, I do not imply that the 
CZMA itself pre-empts the Coastal Commission's permit requirement. 
See n. 6, supra. I believe, however, that the provision for consistency 
review, considered with the other specific provisions for state participation 
in the federal regulatory process, indicates that Congress did not believe 
the States could have imposed separate permit requirements, even before 
passage of the CZMA . 
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Having said this, it is at least clear that duplicative federal 
and state permit requirements create an intolerable conflict 
in decisionmaking. 8 In view of the Property Clause of the 
· Constitution, as well as common sense, federal authority 
must control with respect to land "belonging to the United 
States." Yet, the Court's opinion today approves a system 
of twofold authority with respect to environmental matters. 
The result of this holding is that state regulators, whose 
views on environmental and mineral policy may conflict with 
the views of the Forest Service, have the power, with re-
spect to federal lands, to forbid activity expressly authorized 
by the Forest Service. I dissent. 
8 The Court concludes that Granite Rock has failed to demonstrate a 
conflict because it rejects my conclusion that land use regulation and envi-
ronmental regulation are indistinguishable and because it sees no harm in 
allowing state permit requirements to supersede the decisions of federal 
officials. Ante, at 18. 
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His theory is that, as a matter of state law, the Coastal Commis-
sion only has land use authority. Thus, he rejects the Court's 
conclusion that the Coastal Commission permit can be required 
under the State's power to regulate environmental rna tters. I 
recommend that you not join JUSTICE SCALIA's opinion. I do agree 
that his is the most natural reading of California law. But I 
would be reluctant to rest a decision in this case on this 
Court's rejection of a state agency's interpretation of the state 
organic statute. Thus, I recommend that you take no action. 
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From: Justice Powell 
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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 
No. 85-1200 
CALIFORNIA COASTAL COMMISSION, ET AL., 
APPELLANTS v. GRANITE ROCK COMPANY 
ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT 
[February - , 1987] 
JUSTICE POWELL, with whom JUSTICE STEVENS joins, \ 
concurring in part and dissenting in part. 
Because I agree that this case is properly before us, I join 
Parts I and II of the Court's opinion. In Part III, the Court 
considers the Forest Service's approval of Granite Rock's 
plan to operate its mine in a national forest. Because I can-
not agree with the Court's conclusion that Congress intended 




To understand Part III of the Court's opinion, one must 
have some knowledge of two groups of statutes and regula-
tions. The first group of provisions regulates mining. As 
the Court explains, the basic source of federal mining law is 
the Mining Act of 1872, ch. 152, 17 Stat. 91 (codified, as 
amended, at 30 U. S. C. § 22 et seq.). In general, that law 
opens the public lands to exploration. If one discovers valu-
able mineral deposits, the statute grants him the right to 
extract and sell the minerals without paying a royalty to the 
United States, as well as the right-subject to certain statu-
tory requirements-to obtain fee title to the land. See Min-
ing Act § 1, 30 U. S. C. § 22; United States v. Locke, 471 
U. S. 84, 86 (1985). As the demand for minerals has in-
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creased during the past century, Congress has emphasized 
that an "economically sound and stable domestic mining . . . 
industr[y]" is important to the economy, and to our Nation's 
security. See Mining and Minerals Policy Act of 1970, § 2, 30 
U. S.C. §21a. 1 
B 
The second area of federal law important to this case con-
cerns the management of federal lands. In response to the 
increasing commercial importance of federal lands, as well as 
the awareness of the environmental values of these lands, 
Congress passed the Federal Land Policy and Management 
Act of1976 (FLPMA), 43 U.S. C.§ 1701 et seq. (1982 ed. and 
Supp. III). That statute promotes the effective develop-
ment of federal lands in two ways pertinent to this case. 
First, it directs the Secretary of the Interior to inventory the 
resources located on federal lands and to develop comprehen-
sive plans for future development. §§ 1701(a)(2), 1711, 1712. 
Second, it ensures that the States' interests in these re-
sources will not be ignored: 
"[T]he Secretary shall ... coordinate [his plans] with the 
land use planning and management programs of ... the 
States and local governments within which the lands are 
located. . . . Land use plans of the Secretary . . . shall 
be consistent with State and local plans to the maximum 
'See also National Materials and Minerals Policy, Research and Devel-
opment Act of 1980, § 2(a)(l), 30 U. S. C. § 1601(a)(l) (congressional find-
ing that the availability of minerals "is essential for national security, eco-
nomic well-being, and industrial production"); § 2(a)(3), 30 U. S. C. 
§ 1601(a)(3) (Congressional finding that the extraction of minerals is 
"closely linked with national concerns for energy and the environment"); 
§ 3, 30 U. S. C. § 1602 ("[I]t is the continuing policy of the United States to 
promote an adequate and stable supply of materials necessary to maintain 
national security, economic well-being and industrial production with ap-
propriate attention to a long-term balance between resource production, 
energy use, a healthy environment, natural resources conservation, and so-
cial needs"). 
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extent he finds consistent with Federal law and the pur-
poses of this Act." § 1712( c)(9). 
Significantly, the FLPMA only requires the Secretary to lis-
ten to the States, not obey them. As the Conference Report 
explained: "[T]he ultimate decision as to determining the ex-
tent of feasible consistency between [the Secretary's] plans 
and [State or local] plans rests with the Secretary of the Inte-
rior." H. R. Conf. Rep. No. 94-1724, p. 58 (1976). 
The surface management provisions of the FLPMA do not 
apply to national forest lands. 43 CFR § 3809.0-5(c) (1985). 
Congress first provided for management of these lands in the 
Organic Administration Act of 1897. The current version of 
that statute delegates to the Secretary of Agriculture the au-
thority to "regulate [the] occupancy and use" of national for-
ests. 16 U. S. C. § 551. The Forest Service, as the Secre-
tary's delegate, has promulgated regulations to control the 
"use" .of national forests. 36 CFR §228.1 et seq. (1986). 
Persons wishing to mine in the National Forests submit plans 
of operation detailing their anticipated activities. If the For-
est Service determines that the plans comply with the regula-
tions, it approves them and authorizes the mining operation. 
The Court, by focusing on the Forest Service's concern for 
preservation of the national forests, characterizes these regu-
lations as "environmental" regulations, in its view something 
entirely different from "land use" regulations. Ante, at 
11-13. 
In fact, the regulation of land use is more complicated than 
the Court suggests. First, as is true with respect to the 
Secretary of the Interior, the Secretary of Agriculture has 
been directed to develop comprehensive plans for the use of 
resources located in national forests. See Forest and Range-
land Renewable Resources Planning Act of 1974 (Forest 
Planning Act) § 3(a), as amended, 16 U. S. C. § 1601. The 
Forest Planning Act initially did not require the Forest Serv-
ice to consider the views of state regulators. But when Con-
gress passed the FLPMA in 1976, it also passed the National 
-. 
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Forest Management Act (NFMA), that amended the Forest 
Planning Act. Of special importance, § 6(a) of the NFMA re-
quires the Secretary of Agriculture to coordinate his land 
management plans "with the land and resource management 
planning processes of State and local governments." 16 
U. S. C. § 1604(a). Section 14 specifically requires the Sec-
retary of Agriculture to give state governments "adequate 
notice and an opportunity to comment upon the formulation 
of standards, criteria, and guidelines applicable to Forest 
Service programs." § 1612(a). Thus, it is clear that the 
Secretary of Agriculture has the final authority to determine 
the best use for federal lands, and that he must consider the 
views of state regulators before making a decision. There is 
no suggestion in the statute or the legislative history that 
state regulators should have the final authority in determin-
ing how particular federal lands should be used. 
The Forest Service also has a role in implementing the N a-
tion's mineral development policy. The Court shrugs off the 
importance of this obligation, noting that "the responsibility 
for managing [mineral] resources is in the Secretary of the 
Interior." Ante, at 12 (quoting 36 CFR § 228.1 (1986)). 
This statement erroneously equates mineral resources man-
agement with land use management. Title 43 of the Code of 
Federal Regulations details the activities of the Bureau of 
Land Management (BLM) in this context. Generally, BLM 
manages the process by which rights to minerals are obtained 
from the United States and protected against others, the 
payment of royalties to the Federal Government, and the 
conservation of the minerals themselves. In some cases-
like oil, gas, and coal-BLM supervises leasing of the right to 
extract the materials. But this case involves "hardrock" 
minerals governed by the Mining Act of 1872. With respect 
to those minerals, the ELM's actions are limited to determin-
ing whether the land is subject to location under the mining 
laws; whether a mining claim is properly located and re-




CALIFORNIA COASTAL COMM'N v. GRANITE ROCK CO. 5 
whether the requirements for patenting a claim have been 
complied with. See 43 CFR Parts 3800-3870 (1985). None 
of these determinations is a "land use" determination in the 
sense of balancing mineral development against environmen-
tal hazard to surface resources. The Forest Service makes 
these determinations through its review of a mining plan of 
operation. 
The Organic Administration Act of 1897 makes clear that 
the Forest Service must act consistently with the federal pol-
icy of promoting mineral development. Section 1 of that Act 
precludes the Secretary of Agriculture from taking any ac-
tion that would "prohibit any person from entering upon such 
national forests for all proper and lawful purposes, including 
that of prospecting, locating, and developing the mineral re-
sources thereof." 16 U. S. C. § 478. 2 Forest Service 
materials confirm its duty to balance "[t]he demand for 
mineral development . . . against the demand for renewable 
resources and the land management agency's responsibility 
to reasonably protect the environment." United States 
Dept. of Agriculture, Forest Service Minerals Program 
Handbook preface (1983). See also Forest Service Manual 
§ 2802 (Dec. 1986) (stating that the Forest Service's policy is 
to "ensure that exploration, development, and production of 
mineral and energy resources are conducted in an environ-
mentally sound manner and that these activities are inte-
grated with planning and management of other national for-
est resources"); 30 U. S. C. § 1602. In sum, although the 
Secretary of the Interior has a substantial responsibility for 
managing mineral resources, Congress has entrusted the 
task of balancing mineral development and environmental 
2 More recently, congressional solicitude for development of federal 
mineral resources led Congress to order the President to "coordinate the 
responsible departments and agencies to, among other measures . . . 
encourage Federal agencies to facilitate availability and development of 
domestic resources to meet critical materials needs." 30 U. S. C. 
§ 1602(7). 
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protection in the national forests to the Department of Agri-
culture, and its delegate the Forest Service. 
II 
The Court's analysis of this case focuses on selected provi-
sions of the federal statutes and regulations, to the exclusion 
of other relevant provisions and the larger regulatory con-
text. First, it examines the Forest Service regulations 
themselves, apart from the statutes that authorize them. 
Because these regulations explicitly require the federal per-
mits to comply with specified state environmental standards, 
the Court assumes that Congress · intended to allow state 
enforcement of any and all state environmental standards. 
Careful comparison of the regulations with the authorizing 
statutes casts serious doubt on this conclusion. The regula-
tions specifically require compliance with only three types of 
state regulation: air quality, see 36 CFR § 228.8(a) (1986); 
water quality, see § 228.8(b); and solid waste disposal, see 
§ 228.8(c). But the Court fails to mention that the types of 
state regulation preserved by § 228.8 already are preserved 
by specific nonpre-emption clauses in other federal statutes. 
See 42 U. S. C. § 7418(a) (Clean Air Act requires federal 
agencies to comply with analogous state regulations); 33 
U. S. C. § 1323(a) (similar provision of the Clean Water Act); 
42 U. S. C. § 6961 (similar provision of the Solid Waste Dis-
posal Act). The Forest Service's specific preservation of 
certain types of state regulation-already preserved by fed-
eral law-hardly suggests an implicit intent to allow the 
States to apply other types of regulation to activities on 
federal lands. Indeed the maxim expressio unius est 
exclusio alterius suggests the contrary. 3 
8 The Court rests this part of its pre-emption analysis on Hillsborough 
County v. Automated Medical Laboratories, Inc., 471 U. S. 707 (1985). 
In that case, the Court stated: "[W]e will pause before saying that the 
mere volume and complexity of [an agency's] regulations indicate that the 
agency did in fact intend to pre-empt." ld., at 718. Hillsborough, how-
ever, is quite different from this case. First, the state regulations were 
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The second part of the Court's analysis considers both the 
NFMA and the FLPMA. The Court assumes, ante, at 11, 
that these statutes "pre-empt the extension of state land use 
plans onto unpatented mining claims in national forest lands." 
But the Court nevertheless holds that the Coastal Commis-
sion can require Granite Rock to secure a state permit before 
conducting mining operations in a national forest. This con-
clusion rests on a distinction between "land use planning" 
and "environmental regulation." In the Court's view, the 
NFMA and the FLPMA indicate a congressional intent to 
pre-empt state land use regulations, but not state environ-
mental regulations. I find this analysis unsupportable, 
either as an interpretation of the governing statutes or as a 
matter of logic. 
The basis for the alleged distinction is that Congress has 
understood land use planning and environmental regulation 
to be distinct activities. The only statute cited for this prop-
osition is § 202(c)(8) of the FLPMA, 43 U. S. C. § 1712(c)(8), 
that requires the Secretary of the Interior's land use plans to 
"provide for compliance with applicable pollution control 
laws, including State and Federal air, water, noise, or other 
pollution standards or implementation plans." But this stat-
ute provides little support for the majority's analysis. A 
section mandating consideration of environmental standards 
in the formulation of land use plans does not demonstrate a 
designed to ensure the health of plasma donors, an aim entirely separate 
from the aim of the federal regulations, to ensure the purity of the donated 
plasma. In this case, by contrast, federal authorities already have consid-
ered the environmental effects of Granite Rock's mine. The California 
Coastal Commission seeks only to reconsider the decision of the federal au-
thorities. In any event, the argument for pre-emption in this case does 
not rest on the Forest Service regulations alone, but also on the compre-
hensive regulatory system enacted by Congress. The Court cannot make 
Hillsborough controlling simply by considering the regulations separately 
from their statutory source. As I explain, irifra, at 10-12, the complex of 
applicable statutes and regulations, considered as a whole, pre-empts the 
Coastal Commission's permit requirement. 
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general separation between "land use planning" and "envi-
ronmental regulat~on." Rather, § 202(c)(8) recognizes that 
the Secretary's land use planning will affect the environment, 
and thus directs the Secretary to comply with certain pollu-
tion standards. 
Nor does this section support the Court's ultimate conclu-
sion, that Congress intended the Secretary's plans to comply 
with all state environmental regulations. As I have ex-
plained supra, at 6, other federal statutes require compliance 
with the listed standards. 4 Also, because the FLPMA re-
quires compliance only with "applicable" standards, it is diffi-
cult to treat this one section as an independent and control-
ling command that the Secretary comply with all state 
environmental standards. Rather, viewing the complex of 
statutes and regulations as a whole, it is reasonable to view 
§ 202(c)(8) simply as a recognition that the Secretary's plans 
must comply with standards made applicable to federal activ-
ities by other federal laws. 
The only other authority cited by the Court for the distinc-
tion between environmental regulation and land use planning 
is a Forest Service regulation stating that the Forest Serv-
ice's rules do not "provide for the management of mineral 
resources," 36 CFR § 228.1 (1986). From this, the Court 
concludes that the Forest Service enforces environmental 
regulation but does not engage in land use planning. This 
conclusion misunderstands the division of authority between 
• The Forest Service regulations discussed above mention a slightly dif-
ferent set of environmental standards than does the FLPMA. Both provi-
sions specifically preserve air and water standards. The Forest Service 
regulations also mention solid waste disposal standards; the Land Man-
agement Act also mentions noise control standards. Cf. 42 U. S. C. 
§ 4901(a)(3) (Noise Control Act provision stating that the "primary respon-
sibility for control of noise rests with State and local governments"). The 
slight difference between the two lists of pollution standards, however, is 
insignificant. The feature that all the listed standards have in common is 
that other federal statutes specifically preserve a place for state regula-
tion. See supra, at 6. 
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the BLM and the Forest Service. As explained supra, at 
4-5, the BLM's management of minerals does not entail man-
agement of surface resources or the evaluation of surface 
impacts. Indeed, the Court acknowledges that the Forest 
Service is "responsible for the management of the surface 
impacts of mining on federal forest lands." Ante, at 11. 
The Forest Planning Act and the NFMA direct the Secretary 
of Agriculture and the Forest Service to develop comprehen-
sive plans for the use of forest resources. Similarly, the Or-
ganic Administration Act commands the Secretary of Agri-
culture to promulgate regulations governing the "occupancy 
and use" of national forests, 16 U. S. C. § 551. These regu-
lations are integral to the Forest Service's management of 
national forests. To view them as limited to environmental 
concerns ignores both the Forest Service's broader re-
sponsibility to manage the use of forest resources and the 
federal policy of making mineral resources accessible to 
development. 5 The Coastal Commission has no interest in 
the matters within the jurisdiction of the BLM; the regula-
5 The lack of statutory support for the Court's distinction is not surpris-
ing, because-with all respect-it seems to me that the distinction is one 
without a rational difference. As the Court puts it: "Land use planning in 
essence chooses particular uses for the land; environmental regulation, at 
its core, does not mandate particular uses of the land but requires only 
that, however the land is used, damage to the environment is kept within 
prescribed limits." Ante, at 11-12. This explanation separates one of the 
reasons for Forest Service decisions from the decisions themselves. In 
considering a proposed use of a parcel of land in the national forest, the 
Forest Service regulations consider the damage the use will cause to the 
environment as well as the federal interest in making resources on public 
lands accessible to development. The Forest Service may decide that the 
proposed use is appropriate, that it is inappropriate, or that it would be 
appropriate only if further steps are taken to protect the environment. 
The Court divides this decision into two distinct types of regulation and 
holds that Congress intended to pre-empt duplicative state regulation of 
one part but not the other. Common sense suggests that it would be best 
for one expert federal agency, the Forest Service, to consider all these 
factors and decide what use best furthers the relevant federal policies. 
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tions that it seeks to impose concern matters wholly within 
the control of the Forest Service. Thus, this regulation does 
not support the Court's distinction between environmental 
regulation and land use planning. 
The most troubling feature of the Court's analysis is that it 
is divorced from the realities of its holding. The Court cau-
tions that its decision allows only "reasonable" environmental 
regulation and that it does not give the Coastal Commission a 
veto over Granite Rock's mining activities. But if the 
Coastal Commission can require Granite Rock to secure a 
permit before allowing mining operations to proceed, it nec-
essarily can forbid Granite Rock from conducting these oper-
ations. It may be that reasonable environmental regulations 
would not force Granite Rock to close its mine. This misses 
the point. The troubling fact is that the Court has given a 
state authority-here the Coastal Commission-the power to 
prohibit Granite Rock from exercising the rights granted by 
its Forest Service permit. This abdicatiQn of federal control 
over the use of federal land is unprecedented. 6 
III 
Apart from my disagreement with the Court's charac-
terization of the governing statutes, its pre-emption analysis 
accords little or no weight to both the location of the mine in a 
national forest, and the comprehensive nature of the federal 
statutes that authorized Granite Rock's federal permit. 
One important factor in pre-emption analysis is the relative 
weight of the state and federal interests in regulating a par-
ticular matter. Cf. Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U. S. 52, 66-69 
(1941). The Court recognizes that the mine in this case is 
located in a national forest, but curiously attaches no signifi-
cance to that fact. The Property Clause specifically grants 
6 I express no view as to the Court's conclusion that the Coastal Zone 
Management Act of 1972 (CZMA), 16 U. S. C. § 1451 et seq. (1982 ed. and 
Supp. III), does not pre-empt the state regulation in this case. See ante, 
at 14-17. 
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Congress "Power to dispose of and make all needful Rules 
and Regulations respecting the Territory or other Property 
belonging to the United States." U. S. Const., Art. IV, § 3, 
cl. 2. See Utah Power & Light Co. v. United States, 243 
U. S. 389, 404 (1917). This provision may not of its own 
force pre-empt the authority of a State to regulate activities 
on federal land, but it clearly empowers Congress to limit the 
extent to which a State may regulate in this area. In light of 
this clear constitutional allocation of power, the location of 
the mine in a national forest should make us less reluctant to 
find pre-emption than we are in other contexts. 
The state regulation in this case is particularly intrusive 
because it takes the form of a separate, and duplicative, per-
mit system. As the Court has recognized, state permit re-
quirements are especially likely to intrude on parallel federal 
authority, because they effectively give the State the power 
to veto the federal project. See International Paper Co. v. 
Ouellette, 479 U. S. --, -- (1987); First Iowa Hydro-
Electric Cooperative v. FPC, 328 U. S. 152, 164 (1946). Al-
though the intrusive effect of duplicative state permit sys-
tems may not lead to a finding of pre-emption in all cases, it 
certainly is relevant to a careful pre-emption analysis. 
The dangers of duplicative permit requirements are evi-
dent in this case. The federal permit system reflects a care-
ful balance between two important federal interests: the in-
terest in developing mineral resources on federal land, and 
the interest in protecting our national forests from environ-
mental harm. The Forest Service's issuance of a permit to 
Granite Rock reflects its conclusion that environmental con-
cerns associated with Granite Rock's mine do not justify re-
stricting mineral development on this portion of a federal for-
est. Allowing the Coastal Commission to strike a different 
balance necessarily conflicts with the federal system. 
Furthermore, as discussed supra, at 2-4, Congress already 
has provided that affected States must be afforded an oppor-
tunity to communicate their concerns to the federal regu-
~· . . . 
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lators charged with deciding how federal lands should be 
used. 7 Because Congress has ensured that any federal deci-
sion will reflect the environmental concerns of affected 
States, a duplicative system of permits would serve · no pur-
pose. Indeed, the potential for conflict between state and 
federal decisions has obvious disadvantages. 
IV 
In summary, it is fair to say that, commencing in 1872, 
Congress has created an almost impenetrable maze of argu-
ably relevant legislation in no less than a half-dozen statutes, 
augmented by the regulations of two Departments of the Ex-
ecutive. There is little cause for wonder that the language 
of these statutes and regulations has generated considerable 
confusion. There is an evident need for Congress to enact a 
single, comprehensive statute for the regulation of federal 
lands. 
7 The discussion in Part I deals primarily with the FLPMA and the 
NFMA. In this case, the Coastal Commission actually had yet another 
statutory basis for influencing the federal decisionmaking process. 
Because Granite Rock's mine is near the California Coast, the Coastal 
Commission has a right to consistency review under the CZMA. Thus, if 
the Coastal Commission had voiced its concerns, the Secretary could not 
have approved this permit unless he determined, after a hearing, "that the 
activity is consistent with the objectives of [the CZMA] or is otherwise nec-
essary in the interest of national security." 16 U. S. C. § 1456(c)(3)(A). 
Although the Coastal Commission had notice of Granite Rock's application 
to the Forest Service, it did not object to Granite Rock's activities until 
two years after the application was approved and Granite Rock began min-
ing pursuant to the federal permit. Because the Coastal Commission 
failed to make a timely complaint to the Forest Service, it forfeited its 
right to consistency review under the CZMA. 
By noting the provision for consistency review, I do not imply that the 
CZMA itself pre-empts the Coastal Commission's permit requirement. 
See n. 6, supra. I believe, however, that the provision for consistency 
review, considered with the other specific provisions for state participation 
in the federal regulatory process, indicates that Congress did not believe 
the States could have imposed separate permit requirements, even before 
passage of the CZMA. 
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Having said this, it is at least clear that duplicative federal 
and state permit requirements create an intolerable conflict 
in decisionmaking. 8 In view of the Property Clause of the 
Constitution, as well as common sense, federal authority 
must control with respect to land "belonging to the United 
States." Yet, the Court's opinion today approves a system 
of twofold authority with respect to environmental matters. 
The result of this holding is that state regulators, whose 
views on environmental and mineral policy may conflict with 
the views of the Forest Service, have the power, with re-
spect to federal lands, to forbid activity expressly authorized 
by the Forest Service. I dissent. 
8 The Court concludes that Granite Rock has failed to demonstrate a 
conflict because it rejects my conclusion that land use regulation and envi-
ronmental regulation are indistinguishable and because it sees no harm in 
allowing state permit requirements to supersede the decisions of federal 
officials. Ante , at 18. 
I ' 
February 13, 1987 
85-1200 California Coastal Commission v. Granit.e Rock 
Dear Nino: 
I have now had an opportunity to take a look at your 
dissent ln which you conclude that the Coastal Commission 
only has land use authority. 
Although I would h~sitate to rest a deciston in this 
case primarily on a rejection of the state agency's inter-
pretation of the Caljfornia statute, I do not think vour 
opinion is necessarily inconsistent with my dissenting opin-
ion. If there are changes I could make that would enable 
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JUSTICE BYRON R . WHITE February 13, 1987 
/ 
85-1200 - California Coastal Comm'n 
v. Granite Rock Company 
Dear Nino, 
Please join me in your dissenting 
opinion in this case. 
Sincerely yours, 
Justice Scalia 
Copies to the Conference 
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CHAMBERS OF 
JUSTICE ANTONIN SCALIA 
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February 18, 1987 
Re: No. 85-1200 - Calif. Coastal Comm'n v. Granite Rock 
Dear Lewis: 
I was in New Orleans when your memorandum of February 13 
arrived, and only had time to consider it yesterday. Much as I 
would like to merge our dissents, I am afraid that I do not agree 
with the fundamental proposition that states are prohibited from 
imposing environmental controls on federal lands. I cannot 
imagine any suggested revision of your opinion that would 
overcome that difficulty. 
Would it be possible for you to reconsider the question 
whether my opinion contradicts the state agency's interpretation 
of its own state's statute? As far as I am aware, California has 
not contended that the statute is not a land-use statute, but 
only that it would not use it for land-use purposes in the 
present case. My opinion asserts that is irrelevant. 
Whether we can get together or not, I appreciate your 
effort at trying. I will be happy to talk the matter over if you 
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; 
Fetlruary 18, 1987 
Re: No. 85-1200, California Coastal Commission 
v. Granite Rock Co. 
Dear Sandra: 
Please join me. 
Sincerely, 
Justice O'Connor 
cc: The Conference 
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